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States Rights? What States' Rights?:
Implying Limitations on the Federal
Government from the Overall Design
CALVIN H. JOHNSONt

In recent years, the Supreme Court has been finding
and strengthening judicial doctrines constraining the
federal government in favor of the states, in ways which
have no specific justification in the constitutional text. The
Supreme Court has found, for example, that the federal
government may not prohibit guns on school property,' may
not create a federal civil damages remedy for rape, 2 and
may not demand that local sheriffs check arrest records for
federal gun control laws.3 The states are newly immune
from suit by individuals to enforce federal labor standards,4
and federal trademark and patent remedies.5 State agencies
are immune from federal administrative process of an
adjudicative nature.6 There is a "relatively stable majority
[of the Supreme Court], Professor Richard H. Fallon has
concluded, "[that is] committed to enforcing limits on the

t Andrews & Kurth Centennial Professor of Law, University of Texas.
1. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551-52 (1995).
2. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619 (2000).
3. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997). See also New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (federal government may not force
states to take responsibility for nuclear waste).
4. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 732 (1999).
5. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527
U.S. 666, 691 (1999)). See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996),
which is the seminal (as well as Seminole) case holding that the Eleventh
Amendment gives the states substantive immunity that Congress can not
abrogate.
6. Fed. Maritime Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760
(2002) (state sovereign immunity extends to federal administrative adjudication
brought by private party). But see, N. Ins. Co. of New York v. Chatham County,
547 U.S. 189, 197 (2006) (sovereign immunity does not extend to counties).

225

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

226

[Vol. 57

federal power and to protecting the integrity of the states."
In creating the new restrictions, the Court has been going
beyond the words of the Constitution to find that the
restraints on federal power are "fundamental postulates
implicit in the constitutional design."' The Supreme Court
says that its newly found anti-federal, pro-state moves rest
on the "overall structure and design," "the plan of the
convention,"9 or "the system of federalism established by the
Constitution."' 0
In Righteous Anger at the Wicked States: The Meaning
of the Founders' Constitution" I argued that the newly
found state immunities and constraints on the federal
government do not have a reasonable foundation in the
historical Constitution. The historical Constitution was a
nationalizing act, written to empower an imbecilic and
impotent confederation-level government, and to end the
supremacy of the states. Our Constitution is first a
historical document, a product with a specific program for a
time and place. The historical Constitution was a
nationalizing weapon directed against the states.
The purpose of the historical Constitution was to
empower the national government, not to limit it. As James
Wilson said to the Convention, "[i]t has never been a
complaint agst. Congs. that they governed overmuch. The
complaint has been that they have governed too little."'2 Or
7. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The 'Conservative'Paths of the Rehnquist Court's
FederalismDecisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429 (2002). Professor Gordon Wood has
argued that no one has described the Constitution as having a design of limiting
the federal government and protecting states rights. "This is news to me," Wood
said, "and not at all credible. I know of no interpretation of the origins of the
Constitution that has ever claimed such a thing."Gordon Wood, How Democratic
is the Constitution, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Feb. 23, 2006, at 25 (emphasis added)
(reviewing my RIGHTEOUS ANGER AT THE WICKED STATES: THE MEANING OF THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 2005). Wood is an eminent historian, but he does not
apparently recognize developments within the discipline of law.
8. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 729 (1999).
9. Id. at 730.
10.

Id.

11. Calvin H. Johnson, Righteous Anger at the Wicked States: The
Meaning of the Founders' Constitution (2005) [hereinafter RIGHTEOUS ANGER].
12.

James Wilson, Address at the Federal Convention (July 4, 1787), in 2

THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 10 (Max Farrand ed.,

1911) [hereinafter FARRAND'S RECORDS].
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as Madison had to explain to Jefferson, when Jefferson
returned to America, "[t]he evils suffered and feared from
weakness in Government . . . have turned the attention
more toward the means3 of strengthening the [government]
than of narrowing [it]."'
As Righteous Anger argued,
The most pressing need for the historical Constitution was to give
the federal government a source of revenue to restore its ability to
borrow. Under the Articles of Confederation, which preceded the
Constitution, the federal government had the responsibility for the
common defense, but it had no power to raise money except by
requisitions upon the states. When the Revolutionary War ended,
the states stopped paying their requisitions. The Requisition of
1786, the last before the Constitution, "mandated" payments by
the states, mostly to make current payments to the Dutch creditors
to avoid default on the Revolutionary War debts. The requisition
required payments of $3.8 million, but collected only $663. The
federal government was destitute--"impotent" and "imbecilic" in
the wording of the times.
There had been proposals in 1781 and in 1783 to give the federal
government its own tax, a five percent "impost," or tax on imports.
The impost proposals required an amendment to the Articles of
Confederation, however, and that in turn required unanimous
ratification by the states. The impost proposals were vetoed,
however, the first by Rhode Island and the second by New York.
The Founders were desperate. When war came again the federal
government would need to borrow again. Without a source of
revenue, the federal government could not borrow. This coastline
nation was vulnerable to attack by sea by any of three rapacious
empires and it could pay for neither a sloop nor a gun to defend
itself.
The Founders were angry at the states for their defaults on the
requisitions and for their vetoes of the federal impost. The failure
of requisitions was due to evil and shameful acts by the states.
Rhode Island's veto of the 1781 impost was the "quintessence of
villainy." Rhode Island was a detestable little corner of the
Continent that "injured the United States more than the worth of
that whole state."

The states in their failure to pay requisitions and their
vetoes of the best alternative were endangering the
republican experiment. We had fought a long war for
13. Letter from Madison to Jefferson (Feb. 4, 1790), in 16 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 146, 150 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1961).
14.

RIGHTEOUS ANGER,

supra note 11, at 1-2 (citations omitted).
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independence against5 the most powerful nation on earth as
"a band of brothers."' The states were betraying the great
cause of the Revolutionary War.
Any interpretation of the overall structure of the
Constitution should be consistent with its historical
programmatic meaning. If history determines these things
and there is a conflict between state and federal
government not governed by the writing, the presumption
or default rule implied by the document as a historical act
should be that the federal side wins the conflict. It should be
very hard to find a hard constraint or limitation on the
federal government or states' rights from the overall design
of a document that overall was trying so hard to invigorate
the federal government and to transfer power from states to
the new national government. The specifics of the issue of
the conflict matter. Still if one is going use the grand design
of the historical Constitution to generate a rule, all other
things being equal, the result should favor the federal
government in the conflict with the states.
In Recovering "From the State of Imbecility,"'6 Professor
Keith Whittington, 7 reviewing Righteous Anger at the
Wicked States, defended a vigorous sense of states rights
and limitations on the federal government in favor of the
states in the face of the argument in Righteous Anger that
in the historical Constitution states rights were neither very
vigorous nor important. Professor Whittington is a gracious
reviewer. I am grateful for his kind descriptions of the book
in passing. 8 He accepted, on his way, much of the argument

15. A Citizen of New York (John Jay), Address to the People of the State
of New York (Spring 1788), in I DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 496, 502 (Jonathan Elliot ed.,
1901) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES] .
16. Keith Whittington, Recovering "From the State of Imbecility," 84
Texas L. Rev. 1567 (2006) [hereinafter Recovering].
17. Professor, Princeton University;
University of Texas Law School.

Visiting Professor

(2005-2006),

18. Johnson is "admirably clear" and "marshals copious historical
evidence." Recovering, supra note 16, at 1570. Righteous Anger "deepen[s] our
understanding of constitutionalism," and is a "a useful corrective." Id. at 1575,
1586.
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of the book.19 Still, Professor Whittington argued that (1)
Righteous Anger did not give enough attention to the
limitations of the Federal government in the words and text
of the Constitution and in the source of Federal authority,
and (2) that righteous anger at the states does not
contribute very much to explaining why the Constitution
was adopted. Whittington's objection (1) is about
constitutional law and his objection (2), on causes of the
Constitution, is about history. Righteous Anger is both a
book about interpreting the legal meaning of the
Constitution and a book of history on why the Constitution
was adopted. I defend the Righteous Anger here, on both
constitutional law and constitutional history. A final section
here asks how valid constitutional history can be expected
to relate to binding constitutional law and responds that
history can correct errors, but is probably not binding on us.
I. WHAT IS THE OVERALL CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN?

Constitutional limitations on the power given to the
federal government are said to arise from the text of the
Constitution, and from the legitimating source of the federal
government. Whittington also argues that looking to the
"pivotal voter" would rein in the nationalistic vigor of the
Constitution, and that the purpose of all constitutions is to
limit the power of the state. This section responds, finding
no significant limitation on the federal government in any of
the arguments.
A. What Written Limitations?
In Recovering "From the State of Imbecility," Professor
Whittington argued that Righteous Anger largely "ignores
the constitutional text,"2 "the details of the product of the
Convention,''2

and

the

"particular

provisions

of

the

Constitution as adopted."22 That misstates the issue at stake
19. "Granting that the movement to draft the Constitution was one
directed to building a more powerful national state." Id. at 1578. "[T]he fiscal
crisis . . .undoubtedly contributed to the creation of the Constitution." Id. at
1585-86 (emphasis added).
20.

Recovering, supranote 16, at 1583.

21.

Id. at 1586.

22.

Id. at 1583.
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here because the new "overall structure and design"
doctrines are themselves not textual arguments relying on
some specific words, sentences, or details. I do not mean to
deny that proponents of an overall structure and design
argument would say that their argument is grounded in the
constitution in some way. Still, an overall-structure-anddesign argument means the conclusion sought is not forced
by specific words and you need to go beyond the words.
Professor Whittington, in trying to find more state power,
did not himself parse text, nor quote; did not cite nor rely on
any text. Recovering cites the Constitution only once, and
the cite is not to a limitation on the federal government.23
The Supreme Court's new doctrines are limitations found
beyond or in spite of the writing.
Indeed, the most important limitation on the federal
government, the enumerated power doctrine, has only
dubious support in the constitutional text, and the most
important written state power, the clause requiring states
to give permission for loss of territory, was and remains of
modest importance.
1. Deletion and Defeat of "Expressly Delegated." The
most important constitutional limitation on the federal
government in favor of the states is the enumerated power
doctrine, which holds that Congress has no implied or
plenary power but only the powers written in the
Constitution. The doctrine at best has a "dubious"
grounding in the text.24 Article I, section 8 of the
Constitution does provide for a list of powers that the
Congress is to have. The Constitution does not say,
however, that the list is exhaustive. Indeed, the Framers,
with care and deliberation, took out the language making
the list in section 8 exhaustive and refused to put it back
when challenged. Given the full history, the list of powers in
section 8 seems best read as an illustrative list of the kinds
of things that Congress might do for the common defense
23. Id. at 1579 n.75 (citing U.S. CONST. art. VII to the effect that
ratification required supramajority but not unanimous support, and citing U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 7 to the effect that ordinary legislation required only majority
support).
24. This section is a condensed version of the argument in Calvin H.
Johnson, The Dubious Enumerated Power Doctrine, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 25
(2005).
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and general welfare-a list of campaign promises perhapsbut it is not an exhaustive list.
Article II of the predecessor Articles of Confederation
had provided that Congress would have only the powers
"expressly delegated" to it." The limitation had been added
to the Articles for fear that a future Congress could "explain
away every right belonging to the States, and to make their
own power as unlimited as they please."26 Before the
"expressly delegated" limitation was added, John
Dickinson's 1776 draft of the Articles of Confederation had
listed Congressional powers, without stating whether the
list was exhaustive or illustrative.27 Benjamin Franklin's
1775 draft of the Articles had listed powers for the national
Congress, but explicitly made the list illustrative rather
than exhaustive.2 In the final, ratified Articles, the listed
powers were expressly exhaustive of all the powers
Congress would have.
The Committee of Detail, which wrote the first draft of
the Constitution in Philadelphia, copied the Articles in
structure and language, but they took out the old "expressly
delegated" language.29 Governor Edmund Randolph of
Virginia, who was on the Committee of Detail, explained to
the Virginia Ratification Convention that the expresslydelegated limitation was removed because it had proved
"destructive to the Union."3 Even the federal passport had
been challenged, Randolph said.3"

25. Articles of Confederation art. II, in 19 J. CONTINENTAL CONG. 214
(1912).
26. Letter from Thomas Burke to Governor Richard Caswell of North
Carolina (Apr. 29, 1777), in 6 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS 671, 672
(Paul H. Smith et al. eds., 1980) [hereinafter LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO
CONGRESS].

27. Josiah Bartlett's and John Dickenson's Draft Articles of
Confederation, in 4 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, supra note 26, at 223,
246.
28. Franklin's Articles of Confederation (July 21, 1775), in 1 J.
CONTINENTAL CONG. 195, 196 (1905) (saying "such as" immediately before list of
Congressional powers).
29.
30.
31.

2 FARRAND's RECORDS, supra note 12, at 97.
3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 15, at 600-01.
Id.
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The Framers meant to allow the federal passport,
Randolph's statement tells us, even though the federal
passport was not a listed power. There had been a recent
challenge to the federal passport in Pennsylvania. In 1782,
citizens of Pennsylvania, relying on state law on capture of
prizes, seized the British ship, Amazon, carrying supplies
for the British prisoners of war held at Lancaster,
Pennsylvania. Congress protested the seizure. The Amazon
had been traveling under George Washington's passport.
The Pennsylvania legislature receded, on the advice of its
own Supreme Court, finding its own statute on seizure to be
"unconstitutional" (before there was a written U.S.
Constitution) by reason of its conflict with the federal
passport.3 2 The deletion of the expressly-delegated
limitation was apparently meant to confirm that decision as
a paradigm or core case.
The passport system was a powerful system of control of
travel. The colonies had had passport systems to control
fleeing debtors,33 and the Confederation Congress had
recently instituted a passport system for travel among the
Indians." Patrick Henry protested in Virginia, to no avail,
that if the federal government could require passports by
implication, it would emancipate the slaves by implication. '
The passport system was apparently considered a strong
but legitimate national power. The peacetime passport

32. Debate in Continental Congress (Feb. 20, 1783), in 25 J. CONTINENTAL
CONG. 905, 906 n.1 (1922) ("The Legislature in consequence having declared the
law under which the goods were seized to be void as contradictory to the federal
Constitution."); Elias Boudinot, Speech to the House of Representatives (Feb. 4,
1791), in 1 ANNALS OF THE CONG. OF THE UNITED STATES 1919, 1925 (Joseph Gales
ed., 1834) (reporting that Pennsylvania judges declared the confiscation invalid
because Congress was given the power over passports with the power to declare
war); James Madison, Notes of the Continental Congress Debates (Feb. 25,
1783), in 19 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, supra note 26, at 731
(reporting that Pennsylvania legislature had settled the business by deciding
that Pennsylvania law was unconstitutional in so far as it interfered with
passports).
33. PASSPORT OFFICE, THE UNITED STATES PASSPORT: PAST, PRESENT,
FUTURE (1976).

34.

Ordinance for Dealing with the Indians (June 28, 1786), in 30 J.

CONTINENTAL CONG. 368, 370 (1934).

35. Patrick Henry, Speech to the Virginia Ratification Convention (June
14, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 15, at 446.
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system, however, was not enumerated, nor related to the
enumerated powers.
The proponents of the Constitution were inconsistent on
their intent to limit the Congress to the enumerated list.
The claimed both that the "expressly delegated" limitation
had been taken out because it had proved "destructive to
the Union"36 and also that the federal government was
limited to those powers "expressly delegated" to it. The most
important example of the latter was a speech by James
Wilson in front of Independence Hall shortly after the
convention ended, who said that "[t]he congressional
authority is to be collected, not from tacit implication, but
from the positive grant expressed in the [proposed
Constitution]."" The most famous is Madison's statement in
Federalist No. 45 that "[t]he powers delegated by the
proposed Constitution to the Federal Government, are few
and defined, [while t]hose which are to remain in the State
Governments are numerous and indefinite."38 The most
blatantly inconsistent with the text and action is Charles
Pinckney's speech telling the South Carolina legislature
that under the Constitution the Congress has only the
powers to which they are "expressly delegated."39
The deletion of the old "expressly delegated" limitation
was a hotly debated issue during the ratification debates.
The Anti-Federalists disagreed with the Federalist claim
that the Constitution list of powers was exclusive. Jefferson,
in his first reaction to the Constitution, thought the claim to
an expressly delegated limit "might do for the [crowd before
Independence Hall] to whom it was addressed, but is surely
gratis dictim, opposed by strong inferences from the body of
the instrument, as well as from the omission of the clause of
our present confederation, which declared that in express
36. Edmund Randolph, Debate in the Virginia Ratification Convention
(June 24, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 15, at 600-01.
37. James Wilson, Speech to Public Meeting in Philadelphia (Oct. 6,
1787), in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
339 (Merrill Jensen et al. eds., 1976) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
38. FEDERALIST No. 45, at 315 (Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (Jan.
26, 1788). (Dates in parenthesis refer to date of original publication in New York
newspapers.)
39. Charles Pinkney, Speech to the South Carolina House of
Representatives (Jan. 16, 1788), in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 15, at 259.
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terms."4 "If this doctrine is true," said "A Democratic
Federalist" in Pennsylvania, "it at least ought to have [been]
clearly expressed in the plan of government. ' 4' Arthur Lee
wrote with distain in Virginia that "[Wilson's] sophism has
no weight with me when he declares . . . that in this
Constitution we retain all we do not give up, because I
cannot observe on what foundation he has rested this
curious observation."42 As description of plain text, the AntiFederalists have the better of the argument. If the Framers
promised limitation of the federal government in favor of
the states to the expressed powers, they did not do so in the
writing of the Constitution.
The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution limits
Congress to powers delegated to it, but importantly, it did
not return to the "expressly delegated" language.
Apparently, some unexpressed or implied powers have been
delegated by the People to the Congress. When the AntiFederalists tried to return the word "expressly" into the
Tenth Amendment, they were defeated overwhelmingly.43
The Bill of Rights, as a whole, had symbolic value when
offered, but in context it had very limited substantive
importance. The Anti-Federalists considered the rights
offered in the Bill of Rights to be a sop or diversion.
Madison's Bill of Rights, the Anti-Federalists argued, had
been stripped of those "solid" amendments that would
enhance the power of the states and preserve their
uncontrolled constitutional rights.' The Tenth Amendment,
absent
"expressly,"
looks
especially
"trivial
and
unimportant," neglecting the fundamental issues of
structure of government, just as the Anti-Federalists
40. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in 12
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supranote 13, at 439, 440.
41.

A Democratic

Federalist, PENNSYLVANIA HERALD, Oct.

17,

1787,

reprintedin 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 37, at 386, 387.
42. Letter from George Lee Tuberville to Arthur Lee (Oct. 28, 1787),
reprintedin 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 37, at 505, 506.
43. Aug. 18, 1789, 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 32, at 761. See also Aug.
21, 1787, id., at 797 (reporting that Elbridge Gerry's proposal to add "expressly
delegated" to the Ninth Amendment was defeated, 17-32, without debate).
44. Letter from Robert Yates and John Lansing, Jr., to Governor George
Clinton, in Daily Advertiser (New York), Jan. 14, 1788), reprinted in 2 THE
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST
ARTICLES, AND LETTERS DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION 4.

SPEECHES,
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charged.45 In 1941 the Supreme Court said that the Tenth
Amendment is truism that all is retained which has not
been surrendered, and does not affect the power of the
federal government. 46 Given the defeat of the "expressly
delegated" limit and the context in which it was offered,
that assessment seems true to the history.
With removal of the "expressly delegated" language, the
list of Congressional powers granted by Article I, section 8,
looks like an illustrative list. The appropriate Latin maxim
is ejusdem generis (of the same class or kind), that is, that
the list is illustrative of what Congress might do, rather
than expressio unius est exclusio alterius exclusio (to express
one thing excludes all others), which would make the list
exhaustive. Maybe the list is also a list of campaign promises
bragging about what Congress would be able to do if the
Constitution were ratified. No politician would want the
current list of promises to be the only promises ever available.
In theory, moreover, the Constitutional text as drafted
by the drafting committees was supposed to be loyal to the
motions and resolutions previously adopted by the whole
federal convention. Interpreting the listed powers as not
exhaustive is loyal to the successful motion at the
convention offered by Gunning Bedford of Delaware to give
Congress the power "to legislate in all cases for the general
interests of the Union.47 The powers listed are illustrations of
what Congress might do for the general interest, but they
do not foreclose added implied powers. In any event, the
deletion and defeat of the "expressly delegated" limitation
leaves the constitutional text without a written limitation
on the scope of the federal government.
If the written limitation on the federal government in
the Constitution is inadequate, that is to be expected from
the historical context. The Framers came together to reinvigorate an impotent national government. If the Framers
failed to express the limitations on the federal government
as well as proponents of states' rights would like, it may
well be because that it was just not the problem that the
45. Staughton Lynd, Abraham Yates's History of the Movement for the
United States Constitution, 20 WM. & MARY L. REV. 223, 227 (1963).
46. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
47. Gunning Bedford, Motion of July 17, 1787, in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS,
supra note 12, at 26.
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Constitution was written to fix. The historical Constitution
is a weapon against the states. Except for the (modest) right
of a state to veto loss of its territory, the writing of the
writing of the Constitution gives little or no help to
establish states' rights.
2. The Modest Written State Right to Territory. The
most important written limitation on the federal
government in favor of the states is Article IV, section 3,
which requires that Congress must have permission of a
state to take away some of its territory. The limitation is
modest, even trivial. Its modest purpose was of no avail in
the adoption of the Constitution and we have since
interpreted away any significant substance in the clause.
State permission as to its territory was new in the
Constitution. The Articles of Confederation had allowed
Congress to set up a court to settle territorial disputes
between the states, 8 and Congress could settle the dispute
by taking away territory without a state's permission.
When adopted, the constitutional requirement of state
permission seems to have been mostly for show. There were
a number of proposals for successions breaking up state
territory in 1787. Georgia, North Carolina, and Virginia
claimed the land west of their present borders at least to the
Mississippi. Maine was still part of Massachusetts and New
York still claimed Vermont.4 Vermont was the most serious
issue. There had been serious bloodshed over Vermont
succession, and Vermont had flirted with a British alliance
to defend its succession." Governor George Clinton of New
York had been outraged at Vermont "traitors," and he might
well have decided he was not a nationalist because the
Confederation Congress did too little to stop Vermont

48.
CONGRESS,

ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art.

IX, in

19

J.

OF THE CONTINENTAL

supra note 25, at 213-223.

49. Luther Martin, Genuine Information, FOUNDERS'
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a43_ls6.html
Dec. 28, 2008), catalogs the disputes.

CONSTITUTION,

(last visited

50. JOHN P. KAMINSKI, GEORGE CLINTON: YEOMAN POLITICIAN OF THE NEW
REPUBLIC 63-77 (1993) [hereinafter KAMINSKI]; Peter S. Onuf, State-Making in
Revolutionary America: Independent Vermont as a Case Study, 67 J. AMER.
HISTORY 797 (1981).
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succession." In the Article IV, state-permission clause, the
Constitution took the side of the anti-successionists, as if to
take the staunch anti-succession position of the period that
"[w]e should fix the Boundaries and let the people know
they are Citizens and must submit to their government."52
The clause was also a favor to George Clinton and might
perhaps have softened his anti-federalist stance.
On all the open issues, the state-permission clause
accomplished nothing. Vermont succeeded because New
York could or would not pull together a large enough state
militia to re-conquer it. It was admitted as a separate state,
the fourteenth, in 1791. Tennessee, Kentucky, Alabama,
Mississippi, and Maine were formed out of land claimed by
North Carolina, Virginia, Georgia, and Massachusetts
respectively. George Clinton opposed the Constitution,
notwithstanding the favor extended to him in the statepermission clause. Outside of New York, Anti-Federalist
opponents found the state-permission clause to be yet
another irritant. Luther Martin of Maryland, for instance,
sympathized with all the succession movements and he
argued that the state-permission clause sought to maintain
large state power of states that were already too large and
ought to be broken up.53 Martin's state, Maryland, had no
claims beyond its present borders.
The states' right to permission as to territory, moreover,
has not been given much respect after the founding. The
formation of West Virginia, for instance, had the permission
of something called the "Reorganized Government of
Virginia," meeting in Wheeling (now West Virginia) in
1862."4 The permission was a bit formalistic. The Richmond
or regular branch of the government of the state of Virginia,
then in rebellion, was not consulted and would not have
consented to the transfer of territory. Virginia litigated the
succession of West Virginia, after the end of the Civil War,
and lost.
51. KAMINSKI, supra note 50, at 63-77. Kaminski himself in conversation
suggested that Clinton might have become an anti-federalist over the Vermont
succession issue. Id. at 72.
52.

Letter from John Jones to James Madison (Oct. 2, 1780), in 2 PAPERS

OF JAMES MADISON, 1780-1781, at 106 (William T. Hutchinson & William M.E.

Rachel eds., 1962) (on Vermont).
53.

Martin, supra note 49.

54.

Virginia v. West Virginia, 78 U.S. 39, 43 (1870).
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Written constitutional clauses do sometimes have a halo
or judicial gloss interpreting the clause to preserve some
even more powerful underlying value. Perhaps in another
jurisprudence, preservation of state "territory" could have
been elevated to a more abstract and far more powerful
concept of "sacred land and statehood." We might have
found giants in the earth. But, as the West Virginia
example shows, the territory clause has never meant much.
Given the overall design and pattern of the Constitution,
the state-permission clause was given what seems to be
about the right amount of respect in the West Virginia
succession. Even the most important written state's right is
not all that important.
States are mentioned in the Constitution outside of the
territorial permission clause, but the other provisions have
not been a very important limitation on national power in
favor of a state, nor comfortably described as "states' rights. 55

55. U.S. CONST.art. V allows two-thirds of the states to call a convention
to propose constitutional amendments. A second constitutional convention, if
called, could well be more important than the territory permission clause.
Calling a convention is not a right of single state, however, since another thirtythree states must join to call the convention. It has also never been used or
seriously threatened.
Article V also says that state legislatures can be called upon to ratify
amendments, by three-fourths. State legislatures represent the state in its
corporate capacity. Congress can also bypass the state legislatures and get
ratification from the requisite three quarters from a convention of the people of
the states, as it did in 1933, to repeal prohibition. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 3.
A power of the state legislation over ratification that arises only under
congressional choice can not be classified as a state's right against the federal
Congress. Even if Congress chooses to use the state legislatures for ratification
of amendments, ratification or defeat of ratification can not be achieved by a
single state acting alone.
Before 1913, Article II, section 3, clause 1 provided that Senators would be
chosen by the Legislatures of each state. That was ended by the Seventeenth
Amendment in 1913, which provided for election of Senators directly by the
people. Before the Seventeenth Amendment, the state legislatures had influence
in the Senate decisions, but it still could be outvoted by Senators from other of
the now fifty states. A constitutional right is usually thought of as something
that prevails over legislation, and the power of the states, even before the
Seventeenth Amendment, was an influence on congressional enactments, not a
override in spite of congressional enactments.
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B. Source of FederalLegitimacy
1. Who Made What? A back up to the (nontextual)
enumerated power doctrine is the argument that the states
are primordial and doled out to the federal government only
what powers they expressly gave. Since the federal
government had only what was specifically given to it, the
argument goes, it does not matter that the text does not
state that the list of federal powers is exhaustive. If a power
is not on the list, the federal government does not have it.
Thus even the passport is not a federal power, unless it can
be shoehorned into some other clause or clauses of the
enumeration. The federal government has only those
powers specifically enumerated not because that is what the
Constitution says but because all that was not given away
was retained by the states.
The American states came first, Professor Whittington
argues.56 They were founded long before the Revolutionary
War. They did not need to be constituted; they needed only
to declare their independence from the British Empire.
They were the "relatively natural" political unit that
emerged from Revolution. "They were the governments of
general jurisdiction with all the accoutrements of
sovereignty."57 The states largely did write state
constitutions after independence, but Professor Whittington
attributes this to just a .'Lockean' phase of 'self-conscious'
constitutionalism,"58 and the state constitutions did not
create the states as legal entities.
The federal government is different, Professor
Whittington argues. It was created not just by throwing off
the crown by a declaration of independence. The Federalists
were building something new. The federal government
required a reallocation of the political authority already
held and being exercised by officials in the states. The
Federalists had to wrest some governmental power away to
build the new national government.59 "The Federalists
needed to claim and delegate a specified quantum of
56.

Recovering, supranote 16, at 1575.

57.

Id. at 1575.

58.

Id. at 1576.

59.

Id. at 1576 (emphasis added).
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government power and no more."6 Whatever power the
federal government might have, Whittington would say, had
to be transferred from the states.
Whittington's argument on primordial status has
nothing to do with the written text of the Constitution, but
if true it would add some context in support of the
enumerated-power-doctrine position that the listed powers
are exhaustive.
The contrary position, with fine support in the historical
evidence, is Abraham Lincoln's position that "[t]he Union is
older than any of the States, and in fact, it created them as
States."'" The federal Congress
arose before the
independence of the colonies, as a creation of extralegal
revolutionary
committees
working outside
of the
authorization of the British colonial administration. Before
independence, loyalty to the Congress held together the
Revolution's
radicals
who pushed
for
immediate
independence and the moderates looking for some
accommodation with Britain. The radicals and moderates
might not be able to decide what to do, but both sides could
agree to let the Congress decide. Allegiance to Congress
became the primary test of the right to participate in the
emerging
Revolutionary
polity. 2
Even before
the
Declaration of Independence, the Congress acted as
sovereign to conduct first an embargo against Great Britain
and then a Revolutionary, and serious, War.63 Throughout
the war and the prior embargo, the various revolutionary
committees that took power from the Crown on the local
and colony level looked to the Congress for decisions and
authority. Congress was acting as the de facto sovereign
even before July 4, 1776.

60.

Id. at 1576.

61.

Abraham Lincoln, Special Session Message (July 4, 1861), in 7

MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at 3228 (James D.

Richardson ed., 1897).
62.

JACK

N. RAKOVE,

THE

BEGINNINGS

OF

NATIONAL POLITICS:

INTERPRETATIVE HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS

AN

66 (1979).

63. Richard Morris, The Forgingof the Union Reconsidered: A Historical
Refutation of State Sovereignty over Seabed, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1056, 1057,
1068-1071 (1974); RICHARD MORRIS, THE FORGING OF THE UNION: 1781-1789, at
55-79 (1987).
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The colonies became states under congressional
authorization. The colonies looking to write constitutions,
not dependent on British control, solicited authorization
from the federal Congress.' In 1775, Congress responded to
requests from Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and South
Carolina for how to proceed after taking power.65 Then in
May, 1776, the Congress gave general instructions to the
respective assemblies and conventions in every colony to
suppress the "exercise of every kind of authority under the
[Crown]"66 and to "adopt such government as shall, in the
opinion of the representatives of the people, best conduce to
the happiness and safety of their constituents in particular,
and America in general."67 John Adams called the May
resolution, giving instructions to the colonies to form
themselves into independent states, the "most important...
ever taken in America.""
There were continuities from colonies to states.
Connecticut, for instance, was so effectively self-governing
as a colony that the last elected colonial governor, Jonathan
Trumbull, a strong advocate of independence, continued as
governor after independence. Connecticut's venerated 1662
Charter remained untouched, except for amendments to
take out references to the king.69
Whittington appeals to the "accoutrements" of
sovereignty of the states before the Revolution. No colony,
64. Willi Paul Adams, The First American Constitutions: Republican
Ideology and the Making of the State Constitutions in the Revolutionary Era 47
(Rita Kimber & Robert Kimber trans., 2001) [hereinafter Adams].
65. Recommendation of Congress to the Massachusetts Bay Convention
(June 9, 1775), in 2 J. CONTINENTAL CONG. 83-84 (1905) (resolving that since no
obedience is due to British governor, Massachusetts should govern itself under
its charter as if he was absent); Recommendation of Congress to the Provincial
Convention of New Hampshire (Nov. 3, 1775), in 3 J. CONTINENTAL CONG. 319,
326-27 (1905) (resolving that assembly should take power from the British
administration and form the best government for the people); Recommendation
of Congress to the Convention of South Carolina (Nov. 4, 1775), in 2 J.
CONTINENTAL CONG. 292-93 (1905).
66.
(1906).

Preamble Resolution (May 10, 1776), in 4 J. CONTINENTAL CONG. 358

67.

Id. at 341.

68.

Letter from John Adams to James Warren (May 15, 1776), in 3

LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, supra note 26, at 676.

69.

Adams, supra note 64, at 27.
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however, had "sovereignty" before the Revolution.
"Sovereignty" is a synonym for "supremacy" and no "colony"
has supremacy. That is why they are "colonies." If the
colonies really passed on their status without break, then
the states are still like colonies, accustomed by long practice
to a subordinate position.
Those colonies that wrote new constitutions were of
course doing so as a part of the revolutionary break from
Crown and Parliament. When Whittington calls these
constitutions "Lockean" that means the writers perceived
themselves as in the state of nature without a legitimate
current government and that the consent to government
needed to be achieved anew.7 ° The state constitutions were
not just empty symbolism. The first state constitutions were
tantamount to declared independence and read like
declarations of independence. They created new legal
entities, not resting on British authority. The states by their
original constitutions were breaking the continuity with the
subordinate British colonial entity that had occupied the
same territory as before. And the colonies becoming states
wrote their constitutions under the authority and
instructions of the pre-existing Congress.
It also seems fair as a matter of history to describe the
formation of the state and federal governments in more
muddled terms as both products of small experimental steps
pushing each other and evolving together.' Neither federal
nor state government was hatched full grown, and neither
is primordial. Power was taken from the British authorities
in steps. The formation of a Continental Congress with a
sovereign's power to make war and treaties was an early
and important part of the process, and undertaken before
the states had independence or constitutions. One can
emphasize the local aspects of the seizure of power or the
70.

See, e.g.,

JOHN

LOCKE, Second Treatise of Government, in Two

TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT

(Peter Laslett ed., 1965) (saying all men are

naturally in the state of nature, until their own consents make them members of
some politick society). The Rhode Island town of Scituate, in most Lockean
terms, instructed the state assembly that the king had violated the charter of
government, so power reverted to the people, and Rhode Island would thus need
a new constitution to give legal basis to the government. See ADAMS, supra note
64, at 65. Rhode Island, however, continued to use its colonial charter, only
deleting its references to the king.
71.

ADAMS, supra note 64, at 48.
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national aspects. De facto independence at the township
level was achieved early in many colonies. Still, what states
rights advocates need from the foundational myth is not
just a muddle, or joint development, true to the history, but
a legal primacy or "sovereignty" for states, because there is
nothing helpful for the states' power or enumerated power
doctrine in the written Constitution. Primordial supremacy
of the states, however, is asking more than the history will
bear.
Judicial doctrine, whatever the history, also says that
sovereignty over external affairs transferred from the
Crown directly to the national government, not to the
states. In 1936, the Supreme Court held that the President
had implied powers over foreign affairs beyond those listed,
so as to be able to ban export of military goods:
As a result of the separation from Great Britain by the colonies,
acting as a unit, the powers of external sovereignty passed from
the Crown not to the colonies severally, but to the colonies in their
collective and corporate capacity as the United States of America.
Even before the Declaration, the colonies were a unit in foreign
affairs, acting through a common agency-namely, the
Continental Congress, composed of delegates from the thirteen
colonies. That agency exercised the powers of war and peace,
raised an army, created a navy, and finally adopted the
Declaration of Independence. Rulers come and go; governments
end and forms of government change; but sovereignty survives. A
political society cannot endure without a supreme will somewhere.
Sovereignty is never held in suspense. When, therefore, the
external sovereignty of Great Britain in respect
of the colonies
72
ceased, it immediately passed to the Union.

If external sovereignty passed from Crown to national
government, then plausibly the power to govern the nation
during war-internal sovereignty-passed over directly as
well. The Congress as a matter of practice certainly
exercised war powers domestically in the War for
Independence, even before the Declaration of Independence.
Similarly, the Courts recognized the federal government
as a plenary state without the need for a writing. The
Articles of Confederation were ratified almost at the end of

72.

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316-17

(1936) (citing Penhallo v. Doane, 3 U.S. 54, 80-81 (1795)).
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the Revolutionary War.73 The Congress directed the war
from the first fighting in April 1775 until March 1781
without the Articles, and the national government needed
judicial recognition, to run a war, long before ratification. In
the 1779 Pennsylvania decision of Respublica v. Sweers, for
instance, the defendants Sweers had defrauded the
Continental Army by forging a bigger number for the
payment in their contract to provide supplies, and they
challenged their criminal prosecution on the ground that
there was no United States of America to defraud. The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reasoned that the United
States was a plenary government by the mere act of the
states coming together:
From the moment of their association, the United States
necessarily became a body corporate: for there was no superior
from whom that character would otherwise be derived. In
England, the king, lords & commons are certainly a body
corporate; and yet there was never any charter or statute by
which they were expressly created.74

Under Pennsylvania law, contrary to Whittington's argument,
the National government was a plenary government
without any need for a written confirmation of it.
The Articles of Confederation indeed adopted the theory
that states gave power to the federal Congress. On its face,
the Articles of Confederation identified the adopting actors
of the Articles as "Delegates of States," authorized to act on
behalf of the states.75 The national government under the
Articles was nothing but a firm league of friendship.76 But
73. The primary cause of the delay in ratification was Maryland's
insistence that Virginia give up its claim to Western land. Maryland finally
ratified, apparently because the French wondered why its navy should defend a
state that had not ratified the Articles of Confederation. See RAKOVE, supra note
62, at 285-88.
74. Respublica v. Sweers, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 41, 44 (Pa. 1779) (upholding an
indictment for forgery and fraud on the United States); see also Penhallow v.
Doane's Adm'rs., 3 U.S. 54 (1795) (holding that the Continental Congress had
the authority, before the Articles of Confederation were ratified, to institute a
tribunal for determining prizes at sea and to hear appeals).
75. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, pmbl. and art. XIII, in 19 J.
CONTINENTAL CONG., supra note 25, at 214, 221-22.
76. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. III, in 19 J. CONTINENTAL CONG.,
supra note 25, at 214.
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the Articles also simultaneously limited state sovereignty,
requiring that the states have no control over war and
foreign relations. The states were prohibited from signing
treaties or sending ambassadors and their power to raise
armies and ships was restricted.77 As to the rest of the
world, the United States alone was the sovereign entity and
it had no divisions that other nations could recognize.
The major difficulty, however, in relying on the Articles
to determine authority of the national and state government
is that they have been superseded as a matter of law by the
Constitution itself and, as discussed next, the Constitution
does not rest upon the states. Indeed, when talking about
constitutional law it is seems that the Constitution
supersedes all of the history that precedes it. Continuities
from the prior history might help us understand the
context, but there is no binding constitutional effect to
preconstitutional law. State power before this 1787
Constitution does not matter.
2. The Constitution's Claim to Legitimacy. On its own
terms, the Constitution claims its power from the sovereign
people, and not by transfer or delegation from the preexisting states. The Constitution says that it is ordained
and established by "We, the People."" The Articles, as
noted, had said they were established by authorized
delegates of the states. The Framers intentionally bypassed
the states for ratification of the Constitution, and went
instead to conventions of the people, meeting by state
because only the people could give the Constitution
supremacy over state ordinary law.
The resting of legitimacy of the Constitution upon "We,
the People" was a contested issue in the ratification debates.
The Anti-Federalists objected that the Framers were
supposed to have based their authorization of the
Constitution on "We, the States" instead of "We, the
People." Resting the Constitution upon the sovereignty of
the People, the Anti-Federalists claimed, proved that the

77. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. VI, in 19 J. CONTINENTAL CONG.,
supra note 25, at 216.
78.

U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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Framers intended a perfect consolidation and annihilation
of the states.7 9
The Federalist proponents, on their side, celebrated
that the Constitution was "founded upon the power of the
people."8 "[I]n this government," James Wilson told the
Pennsylvania Ratification Convention, "the supreme,
absolute and uncontrollable power remains in the people.'
The people were the supreme power "from which there is no
appeal."2 The consent of the people, Hamilton stated in
Federalist No. 22, is that "pure original fountain of
legitimate authority. 83
The U.S. Constitution had to be ratified by the people
and not by the state legislatures in order to achieve
supremacy and permanency. As Jefferson had argued when
Virginia formed its constitution, a constitution could not be
enacted by ordinary state legislatures because no
legislature could pass an act to transcend the power of
future legislatures. 4 Madison wrote to Jefferson in his
preparation for the Convention, consistently, that the new
system he was advocating would have to be ratified by the
people of the several states to render the national
Constitution paramount over state legislatures and state
John Smilie, Pennsylvania Convention Debates (Nov. 28, 1787), in 2
supra note 37, at 382, 407-09; Patrick Henry, Virginia
Convention (June 4, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 15, at 22-23;
Samuel Nasson, Massachusetts Convention, (Feb. 1, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 15, at 134; John Lansing, Debate in the Federal
Convention (June 16, 1787), in 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 12, at 257.
79.

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,

80. See James Wilson, Pennsylvania Ratification Convention (Dec. 11,
1787), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supranote 15, at 497-98.
81. Id. at 431. See also id. at 433 (saying that if there can not be two
sovereigns, then the people and not the states have the sovereignty); Id. at 45758 (saying "[m]y position is, sir, that, in this country, the supreme, absolute, and
uncontrollable power resides in the people at large; that they have vested
certain proportions of this power in the state governments; but that the feesimple continues, resides, and remains, with the body of the people.").
82.
83.
1787).

Id. at 432.
FEDERALIST No. 22, supra note 38, at 146 (Hamilton) (December 14,

84. Thomas Jefferson, Draft of a Constitution for Virginia (June 1783), in
6 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 13, at 285; THOMAS JEFFERSON,
NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (1787), available at http://www.yale.edul
lawweb/avalon/jevifram.htm.
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constitutions. 85 The Articles of Confederation had the
radical vice, Madison said, of "want of ratification by the
people."86 The defect resulted in the "evil" that "[w]henever a
law of a State happens to be repugnant to an act of
Congress . .. it will be at least questionable whether the
latter must not prevail." 7 No state could be given the power
to infringe this Constitution nor the power to amend it
alone by a subsequent legislation. The States, indeed,
plausibly did not have the power to ratify the Constitution
or give power to the national government because they had
been given their power by the sovereign people and were not
at liberty to redirect any of that power over to some other
body. No state could ratify this Constitution and no state
did. "No State, in its corporate capacity," William Pinckney
of South Carolina would later argue, "ratified [this
Constitution] .8
Both the Resolution of Congress that authorized the
Philadelphia Convention and the Resolution of the
Annapolis Convention that called for the Philadelphia
Convention had required that the Convention's proposal be
ratified by every state legislature, as required by the
Articles of Confederation for amendments to the Articles.89
The Federalists overrode their instructions. The Federalists
argued that the Convention was not illegal, although it had
the
because
resolutions,
its empowering
ignored
Constitution was merely a proposal when the writing was
finished in Philadelphia. "I have never heard before,"
Wilson argued before Pennsylvania, "that to make a

85.

Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (March 19, 1787), in

9 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 52, at 318.

86.

James Madison, Vices of Political System 8, in 9 PAPERS OF JAMES

MADISON, supra note 52, at 345, 352.

87. Id. Madison was worried especially because the question of
supremacy of state law over acts of Congress would be decided by the 'Tribunals
of the State, [which] will be most likely to lean on the side of the State." Id.
88. William Pinckney, Argument before the Supreme
McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (Wheat.) 316, 377 (1819).

Court

in

89. Alexander Hamilton, Address of the Annapolis Convention (Sept. 14,
1786), in 3 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 686 (Harold C. Syrett ed.,
1966) [hereinafter HAMILTON PAPERS]; Resolution of Congress (Feb. 21, 1787), in
32 J. CONTINENTAL CONG., supra note 25, at 74.
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proposal was an exercise of power."9 The Constitution
would be given effect only if ratified by the people at large.
Ratification by the people also had a necessary strategic
element to it. The Founders did not think they could get
ratification from state legislators who would lose power if
the Constitution went into effect. The opposition to the
Constitution would come most likely, Governor Randolph
said, from "the local demagogues who will be downgraded by
it from the importance they now hold."'" The Founders did
not think they could get unanimity. Rhode Island, New
York and Virginia had vetoed the five percent impost
proposals, the easiest remedies for the federal destitution,
and would most likely veto any more comprehensive change.
Since the Framers did not think they could get ratification
from the states, they went to people instead. Opposition
would come, James Wilson predicted, from "interested
men," but the people "will follow us into a national Govt."92
The Framers used the People against the states. They
ended state supremacy over the national government on the
authority of the sovereignty of the People.
Under the Constitution itself, no state would be bound
by the Constitution until that state's convention had
ratified.9 3 Ratification of the Constitution, moreover, was by
state, with a minimum of nine states required, and not by a
consolidated vote along the country. The people of each
state met in a separate convention. Nonetheless, the
Framers were using the conventions of the people of the
state as tool or weapon against the government of the state.
Under the Articles, the state governments had been
supreme over the Congress and the Congress was the agent
of the state governments, but when the ratification of the
Constitution was completed, by the People, the state
governments were made subject to the supremacy of the
federal government.

90.
in 2

James Wilson, Pennsylvania Ratification Convention (Dec. 4, 1787),
supra note 15, at 469.

ELLIOT'S DEBATES,

91. Edmund Randolph, Speech to the Federal Convention (July 23, 1787),
in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 12, at 89.
92.

James Wilson, Speech to the Federal Convention (June 16, 1787), in 2

FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 12, at 253.

93.

U.S.
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Thus under the history, the text and the intellectual
arguments, there is no supremacy of states or states' rights.
C. The Pivotal Voter
Whittington criticizes Righteous Anger on the ground
that it draws the Constitution's meaning from the strongest
proponents of nationalization, often as indicated by their
concerns
going into the Philadelphia
convention.
Whittington claims that the Philadelphia convention
"significantly blunted" Madison's nationalizing impulses
and that nationalists including Madison had to make
compromises to satisfy the pivotal voter. Whittington
argues that the pivotal voter is closer to the decentralizing
concerns of Roger Sherman than to the national enthusiast
James Madison.4
The pivotal voter in the ratification of the Constitution
has to be understood as deeply within a nationalistic
consensus. Delegates representing sixty-five percent of the
electorate (weighing states by population) ultimately voted
to ratify the Constitution.95 All regions supported the
Constitution at near landslide levels: New England voted
fifty-nine percent for ratification; Mid-Atlantic was sixty-six
percent for ratification and South was sixty-three percent
for ratification. Opponents to ratification garnered just over
a third of the delegates (weighted by population) overall.
The Constitution got more popular as time went on. The
Anti-Federalists started with a majority in the Anti-Federal
states of New York and Virginia, but even New York and
Virginia ratified after the debates. Even Anti-Federal Rhode
Island and North Carolina eventually ratified. Once the
Constitution was ratified, Anti-Federalism shrank to a
94.

Recovering, supranote 16, at 1583-84 n.102.

95. The sixty-five percent figure is an average weighted by population. It
is computed by multiplying the population of each state by the percentage of
delegates in favor of ratification, then adding the products, then dividing the
sum by the population as a whole. See RIGHTEOUS ANGER, supra note 11, at 129
for population figures. The Constitution by its own terms required only nine
states for ratification and the Framers did not expect ratification by all. If we
exclude the four closest states, Rhode Island (fifty-two percent), Virginia (fiftytwo percent), Massachusetts (fifty-three percent) and New York (fifty-four
percent), the minimum nine states needed for ratification went seventy-six
percent for the Constitution. Calculations, based on 1790 census, are on file with
the author.
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stigmatized minority and then disappeared. In the First
Congress, Anti-Federalist held only fifteen percent of the
voting power, and could get nothing that the Federalists did
not want.96 By 1790, opposition to the new Constitution, as
Jefferson himself put it, "almost totally disappeared." 97 The
new Constitution and new President were idolized. Once the
country got used to the new Constitution, it is clear that the
pivotal voter would have tolerated a far more radical change
than the Constitution in fact effected. Pivotal voter talk
does not undercut its nationalist vigor.
Roger Sherman of Connecticut is not at the center on
the votes on federalism, as Whittington argues, except when
he became a driving nationalist. Roger Sherman, for
example, made a motion in the Convention to deny the
federal government power to lay "direct" or internal taxes,
but he lost on his motion overwhelmingly, two states in
favor to eight states against.98 Both proponents and
opponents of the Constitution called Federal power to lay
direct tax the key issue of the ratification debates.
Sherman said in defense of his motion that he wanted to
prevent the national government from intruding on the
"Government of the individual States in any matters of
internal police."'' 0 The eight-to-two state majority of the
96.

RIGHTEOUS

ANGER,

supra note 11, at 131.

97. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Lafayette (April 2, 1790), in 16 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 13, at 292, 293.
98.

2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 12, at 25-26.

99. See, e.g., Letter from George Washington to Thomas Jefferson (Aug.
31, 1788), in 30 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: FROM THE ORIGINAL
MANUSCRIPT SOURCES, 1745-1799, at 82-83 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1944),
available at http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/washington (saying that the AntiFederalist amendment to prevent federal direct taxes was the only amendment
to which he really objected but it was the one most strenuously insisted upon by
the Anti-Federalists); Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Dec. 2,
1787), in 12 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 37, at 332 (saying that denying
Congress the power to lay direct taxes was the "most popular topic among the
adversaries"); James Monroe, Debates in the Virginia Ratification Convention
(June 10, 1788), in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 37, at 1109 (saying that
to render the Congress "safe and proper, I would take from it one power only-I
mean that of direct taxation"); see also Calvin H. Johnson, Apportionment of
Direct Taxes: The Foul-up in the Core of the Constitution, 7 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 15-24 (1998).
100. Roger Sherman, Federal Convention (July 17, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S
RECORDS, supra note 12, at 25.
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Convention seems to have thought instead, that "[t]here are
instances without number, where acts necessary for the
general good ... must interfere with internal police of the
states."1" Sherman was in the overwhelmed minority on the
key issue.
Sherman seems to have moved more toward
nationalism than he moved the convention. His close
Connecticut colleague, Oliver Ellsworth, for instance, early
in the Convention moved to strike the word "national" from
the early Virginia-Plan proposal to create a "national
government" because Ellsworth
wanted to preserve the
"confederation"
mode.0 2
The
Convention,
however,
thereafter began to use the word "national" as if Ellsworth
had never spoken.0 3 By the end of June, Ellsworth himself
said he wanted to establish a national legislature,
executive, and judiciary to preserve peace and harmony." 4
By the time of the Connecticut Ratification Convention,
Ellsworth was saying that the Constitution was based on
"the necessity of combining our whole force and, as to
nationalpurposes, becoming one state."'0 5 The joint report of
Ellsworth and Sherman to the Governor of Connecticut
takes a position that was anathema to the later
Jeffersonians, that is, that tax may be used for the general

101. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James Duane (Sept. 3, 1780), in 2
HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 89, at 402.
102. Oliver Ellsworth, Federal Convention, June 20, 1787, in 1 FARRAND'S
RECORDS, supranote 12, at 335.
103. See, e.g., William Johnson, Federal Convention (June 21, 1787), in 1
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 15, at 431 (describing New Jersey plan as creating
a distinct national government, but one that is not totally independent of that of
the states); id. at 226 (debating whether members of the national legislature
should be paid out of the national treasury); id. at 215 (unanimously passing
resolution that the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers of the national
government, ought to be bound by oath to support the articles of the union"); id.
at 219 (passing resolution that a national executive be instituted to consist of a
single person to be chosen by the national legislature); id. at 209 (unanimously
passing resolution that a nationaljudiciary be established).
104. Oliver Ellsworth, Federal Convention (June 29, 1787), in 1 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 15, at 465.

105. Oliver Ellsworth, Connecticut Ratification Convention (January 4,
1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 15, at 186.
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welfare and not just for enumerated powers. °6 By the time
of the debate over the Tenth Amendment, Roger Sherman,
who had once advocated an exclusive enumeration of
Congress' power,' °7 was contributing to the defeat of an
Anti-Federalist attempt to limit Congress to the powers
expressly delegated to it.' °8 If Sherman is viewed as the
champion of decentralized power in the Convention, then,
best viewed, he lost on that side and thereafter moved over
to the nationalist side.
Madison did lose in the Convention on issues that were
important to him, as Righteous Anger discussed at some
length.' 9 Madison hated the malapportionment of the
Senate, the rule giving the same voting weight to tiny states
as to large ones. It was "magic and not reason," James
Wilson had said, that "annexing the name of 'State' to ten
thousand men, should give them equal right with forty
thousand.""' Madison was consistent, saying among other
things that equal votes for large and small states was the
"radical vice" of a confederation system."' Madison,
nonetheless, lost on the voting rule in the Senate.

106. Letter from Roger Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth to the Governor of
Connecticut (Sept. 26, 1787), in 3 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 12, at 99
(saying that "[t]he objects, for which congress may apply monies, are the same
mentioned in the eighth article of the confederation, viz. for the common defence
and general welfare").
For Jeffersonian opposition of use of tax justified only by the general
welfare, see Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin (June 16, 1817), in
12 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 13, at 71-73 (enumerated
powers provide an "exact definition" power to tax for the general welfare); 3
FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 12, at 494 ("Common defence and general
welfare [are used] as general terms, limited and explained by the particular
clauses subjoined to the clause containing them.").
107. 2 FARRAND's RECORDS, supra note 12, at 26 (saying that Sherman "in
explanation of his ideas read an enumeration of powers").
108. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 790 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). See also id. at 797
(reporting that Elbridge Gerry's proposal to add "expressly delegated" to the
Ninth Amendment was defeated, 17-32, without debate).
109. RIGHTEOUS ANGER, supra note 11.

110. James

Wilson, Continental

Congress

(Aug. 1, 1776),

in

6 J.

CONTINENTAL CONG., supra note 25, at 1105.

111. James Madison, Federal Convention (Jun 30, 1787), in 1 FARRAND'S
RECORDS, supra note 12, at 485].
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Madison also wanted a national veto over state laws to
prevent their frequent and flagrant violations of individual
rights and their wicked failures as to their national
duties." 2 He did not get it, notwithstanding his many tries
and his passion. Of course the Constitution is interpreted to
include Madison's losses. There is no federal veto over state
law "in any case whatsoever" for the protection of individual
rights, as Madison had wished. The Senate is as it is. Still
the changes that Madison accomplished are, to use Gordon
Wood's description, "breathtaking" in comparison to the
Articles of Confederation that went before." 3 The losses
upset Madison, but the hole in his donut does not in the end
dominate the donut.

D. Let's Get Rid of "States'Rights"Usage
Professor Whittington argues that the primary function
of "constitutionalism" is to protect individual rights against
the power of government.' "A true constitution," Giovanni
Sartori has said, "is defined by its aims of limiting
government.""'
The Constitution's "essential quality",
according to Charles McIlwain, is "legal limitation on
government,"'6 and "true safeguards of liberty against
arbitrary government." 7
"States rights"-the limitations of the federal government
in favor of the states- are, however, a very different thing
from individual rights, limiting the federal government in
favor of individuals. "States rights" have often been the
enemy of individual rights. Conflating "states rights" with
"individual rights" is a terrible mistake because makes it
impossible to see the conflict between a state and
individuals.
112. See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24,
1787), in 10 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 52, at 209, 212.
113. Gordon Woods, Ideology and the Origins of LiberalAmerica, 44 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 633 (1987).

114. Recovering, supra note 16, at 1586.
115. Id. at 1569 n.13 (citing Giovanni Sartori, CONSTITUTIONALISM: A
PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIOn, 56 AM. POL. SC1. REV. 853, 860 (1962)).
116. Id. at 1568 (quoting CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM:
ANCIENT AND MODERN 24 (1940)).

117. Id. at 1568.
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A large segment of the debate over the ratification of
the Constitution was whether the federal or state
government would be a better protector of individual rights.
James Madison's theory of the extended republic that
supported ratification was a "proof' that the federal
government was better protector of individual rights than
were the states. For Madison, the states were the paradigm
rights abusers. Patrick Henry in Virginia, for example, sought
to tax all for the support of ministers and he prevented outof-state creditors access to Virginia courts. In a reasonable
sense, the Constitution can be viewed as revenge upon
Henry for all the issues Madison had lost to him in the prior
decade.' 18 The Anti-Federalist opponents of the Constitution
did indeed contest the claim that the Federal government
would be the better protector of individual rights. Still, for
those who were in favor of ratification, the new national
government would better protect individual rights.
States' rights have often been the enemy of individual
rights since the founding debates. For the twentieth
century, "states rights" was a code word for preserving
white power and segregation. The "civil rights" movement
achieved racial equality before the law and some measure of
respect for the dignity of racial minorities only by pushing
back "states rights." Before the civil war, the most
important "state right" was, to quote the constitution of the
19
Confederacy, "the right of property in negro slaves.""
Southern elites were afraid that a national majority would
impair or end slavery. Since they wanted protection to own
other people, destroying the rights of those other people, it
was important that their state government rather the
national government decide the issue. 20
States rights plausibly still defeat individual rights.
Professor Jed Rubenfeld speculates that the Supreme
Court's current federalism cases are pretexual and that the
real motive is to prevent the expansion of antidiscrimination remedies that the Court is not comfortable
with."' In University of Alabama v. Garret"' the Court gave
118. RIGHTEOUS

ANGER,

supra note 11, at 51-57.

119. CONST. OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, art. II, § 9, cl. 4
reprinted in THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE
CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA 15 (James M. Mathews ed., 1988).

120. Robin Einhorn, American Taxation: American Slavery 8 (2006).
121. JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY (2005).
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the state of Alabama immunity from suit under a federal
statute protecting rights of disabled persons, and in
Morrison v. United States,123 the Supreme Court held that
Congress could not provide a civil cause of action by which a
rape victim could sue the football player who had raped her.
Both cases might be described as continuing the tradition
by which "states rights" restrictions get in the way of
individual rights. It is hardly a necessary conclusion, in any
event, that state powers or immunities enhance individual
rights or are identical with individual rights.
Federalism issues of conflicts between federal and state
governments are important issues. They seem to fall within
what Professor Whittington calls the "uninteresting" and
"commonplace" issues of government power, 124 rather than
the individual rights sector, but power and its allocation is
not entirely without interest. As a matter of unrestrained
policy-on fresh canvas-the question of whether the
national or state governments should decide an issue is
often a hard question and the answer varies from issue to
issue.'25 "States rights," however, is not a constructive tool
122. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garret, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
123. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
124. Recovering, supra note 16, at 1576.
125. The policy of federalism is way beyond what can be covered in a short
response, but these are notes:
Sometimes, we need to avoid a national majority imposing a single solution
on a nation-wide basis. The diversity of tastes across the country should imply
that each local group, broken down into groups much smaller even than a state,
should be able to decide a question to its own tastes-chacun & son godt. Indeed,
sometimes decisions should be left to each individual consumer and not decided
by a group or any government at all. Even if the decision is formally allocated to
the national level by tradition or Constitution, one would hope that a national
decision would recognize the diversity of individual tastes. Sometimes, no
uniform national rule should prevail.
Some decisions, by contrast, get worse when they are balkanized because
balkanization separates the beneficiaries and bearers of any cost. States and
localities try to impose costs and harms on their neighbors, who they can
disregard because they do not vote. Small groups try to avoid taxes and
responsibilities. All states naturally try to export their taxes onto out-of-state
nonvoters and to protect their local voters from out-of-state nonvoters. The
behavior arises naturally from politicians' need to get elected by voters, but not
by nonvoters. Small groups compete destructively to profit from havens and
immunities from quite reasonable responsibilities. Indeed the Constitution was
necessary as a historical document because states refused to pay their share of
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to analyze the issues, especially for that collection of
decisions that are better made on the national level, and
especially for those issues in which the states are abusing
individual rights.
States, plausibly, should not even be considered to be
rights-bearing entities. Nazi regimes might give the Reich
rights over individuals, and Communist regimes might give
the Soviet all power over individuals, but in the America, a
liberal democracy, individuals are sovereign over the state.
Individuals, and not Reichs, Soviets or States, bear rights.
States may have powers, but not rights. If the states serve
as some kind of proxy for individuals, we would do better to
look through the states to the individual rights, or at least
recognize that the states are at best imperfect proxies for
individuals. As long as there exists a case in which a state
right conflicts with an individual right, the term "state
rights" obscures the conflict. "States' rights" indeed is
arguably an offensive grammar, an oxymoron, because
"rights" belong to the people, not to governmental units.
"States rights" do not deserve the prestige accorded to the
rights given to real individuals.
II. THE CAUSES OF THE CONSTITUTION
Righteous Anger is first an endeavor within
constitutional law, skeptical as to states' rights. It is also,
however, a history of the Constitution that tries, sincerely,
to figure out what factors contributed to the adoption of the
Constitution and what weight to give to the causes that
have been offered over the last 220 years. History, including
a weighing of causes, should be germane to the
interpretation of the legal effect of the Constitution, at least
as to overall effect, and at least for those branches of
"constitutionalism" that purport to rely on originalism. But
the common defense and they vetoed the impost, by which the national
government could pay for the common defense on its own.
There is no general solution to determine whether decisions should be
made nationally (or even globally), on the one hand, or by locality or individual,
on the other. I find it plausible that neither the text nor history of the
Constitution sorts out the allocation of power in the way that fits the best policy
for every issue. We may sometimes need to rely on the good sense of the
legislature. Binding constitutional law and policy may not be the same. Still,
neither Righteous Anger nor the Recovering from Imbecility review has much
constructive to say about the policy of allocating decision-making authority.
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perhaps not. Constitutional interpretation in law does
depart from history, often, and law does not become
respectable history meeting professional standards of
history, even with a few adornments quoting old documents.
Still, even while history is not the same as law, the
Constitution is our foundational document and its history is
of continuing interest, just because the nation wants to
understand its roots. Our history provides object lessons of
bad behavior, to be avoided, as well as valuable traditions
and binding law, but both bad and binding history are of
interest and should be written honestly.
The historiography of the Constitution is filled with
attempts to explain the Constitution in terms of a
dominating or overall cause that purportedly gives meaning
to the whole. Many of the offered overall explanations are
distinctly unsympathetic to the Constitution. Jefferson
seems to have thought the Constitution was written to scare
Shaysites into submission and he understood Shaysites to
be yeoman farmers rebelling with justice for better terms on
taxes and debts. 26 Righteous Anger argued that Shays'
Rebellion was not very important to the adoption of the
Constitution and indeed that Shays' worked better on the
Anti-Federalist
side to show the vigor of state
governments.127
Charles Beard interpreted the Constitution as a
conservative economic document written to suppress paper
money so as to make debts harder to pay.'28 Righteous Anger
argued that paper money was not important in the debates,
primarily because Anti-Federalists as well as Federalists
condemned paper money, from the lesson of the failure of
the Continental dollar.'29 Madison's core argument, in
Federalist No. 10, was that the Federal government would
inevitably do a better job of protecting minority voters than
would the state governments.

126. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Stephens Smith (Nov. 13,
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 13, at 356-57 (saying
the Constitution was a kite, a small hawk, sent up to scare the henhouse).

1787), in 12 THE PAPERS

127. RIGHTEOUS ANGER, supranote 11, at 213-22.
128. CHARLES

BEARD,

AN

ECONOMIC

INTEPREPRETATION

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 154, 324 (1913).

129. RIGHTEOUS ANGER, supranote 11, at 207-10.

OF

THE
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Righteous Anger also argued that other issues were less
important to the adoption of the Constitution than others
have said. Individual rights, slavery and democracy are
very important issues, but that they were issues pushed to
the back burner because of the paramount need to create a
strong national government to restore the federal credit and
serve the national defense. 3 ° Whittington cares about
checks and balances, but Righteous Anger argued that the
Framers were skeptical about "checks and balances,"
considering them more appropriate to a monarchial system
than to a republic.' I found regulation of commerce to be a
"modest little power" contributing almost nothing to the
adoption of the Constitution.'32 Righteous Anger examined
130.

RIGHTEOUS ANGER, supra note

11, at 163-86.

131. RIGHTEOUS ANGER, supra note 11, at 68, 166. Whittington attacks
RIGHTEOUS ANGER for "dismiss[ing] as a sideshow" the 'clever combination of
New World gears and gadgets' that occupied so much of the framers' time."
Recovering, supra note 16, at 1585 (quoting AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S
CONSTITUTION 87 (2005)). I am in fact more skeptical about value of "checks and
balances" than other scholars. A separate executive seems to have arisen more
for efficiency than as a "check." Madison told Jefferson before the Convention
that he wanted a separate executive so that as Congressional powers increased,
there would not be mismanagement. Letter from James Madison to Thomas
Jefferson (Mar. 19, 1787), in 9 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supranote 52, at 31819. The Framers in Philadelphia dismissed John Adams, who represented
"checks and balances" as too monarchical in favoring a balanced or mixed
Constitution. GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 17761787, at 567-92 (1969). Consistently, John Quincy Adams was an AntiFederalist before ratification because he found the Constitution inconsistent
with his father's book that emphasized separation of powers. Letter from John
Quincy Adams to William Cranch (Oct. 14, 1787), in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 37, at 75. The Founders did distrust direct democracy, leading them,
for example, to the ill-advised Electoral College. I did not mean to dismiss
"checks and balances" entirely, however, and there is no question that "checks
and balances" shows up in the debate in ways that RIGHTEOUS ANGER did not
discuss.
132. RIGHTEOUS ANGER, supra note 11, at 189-201. Professor Whittington
argues that an important part of "regulation of commerce" was a program to
retaliate against foreign powers that excluded American ships from their ports.
Recovering, supra note 16, at 1580. Wrhittington argues the failure to exercise
the power to retaliate was due to changed circumstances. Id. at 1580-81 n.83. At
the first chance in the first new session, however, Congress rejected retaliation
against the British because the British could too easily react by excluding
American ships from the English ports. The rejection of retaliation is
contemporaneous and reflects the considered judgment that those who live in
glass houses should not throw penalty imposts. That was the situation as the
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these and other theories about the formation of the
Constitution and concluded that there was not much weight
to these theories or the causes they cite.
There was no a priori reason to downgrade or disregard
any of these factors. But the downgrading was the
appropriate conclusion from the surviving evidence
carefully and neutrally re-examined. Not every judgment
Righteous Anger reached is critical to the overall force of the
Constitution. On the history, Righteous Anger was just
trying to understand the causes of the Constitution in its
own times and for its own sake from a fresh look at all the
available original-source evidence. The history of the
Constitution is of interest for its own sake even it has no
impact on the law.
A. Necessary Anger
Righteous Anger concluded that righteous anger at the
wickedness of the states was a necessary cause of the
Constitution. Anger was necessary, first, to overcome the
norm strong at the time that changes had to be unanimous.
Both the Articles of Confederation and the resolutions that
empowered the Convention, as noted, required approval of
any changes to the Articles by all of the states.133 Before the
Articles and the empowering resolutions, moreover, the
Revolutionary War had also been fought under the
assumption that the states would reach a united consensus.
The Framers overrode the prior understanding
demanding unanimity, ignored their instructions, and
ripped up the Articles. They were angry enough at the
states that they presumed that at least one state would
reject in bad faith the minimum necessary changes and they
were angry enough at the states that they decided they did
not need unanimity. The Framers provided that the
Constitution would go into affect with ratification by only
nine states. They also sent the Constitution for ratification
by the people rather than the state legislatures because
they thought that state office holders would try to retain
their power, in bad faith, and veto a nationalizing
document. Without the anger and the reasons for it, the
Constitution was drafted and not a changed circumstance. RIGHTEOUS
supra,at 194-95.
133. See supranote 89 and accompanying text.
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book argued, the Framers could have drafted the needed
fiscal reforms within the confederation mode. Without the
anger they would have drafted an alternative Constitution
that compromised enough with the opponents to get their
acquiescence, and that alternative Constitution would have
been more agreeable to the states and less radical in its
nationalist vigor.
The Framers of the Constitution were angry at the
states for betraying the great cause of the Revolutionary
War. The states had betrayed their duties to the great
republican cause by failing to supply Washington's Army.
Their contribution was far below what reasonably could
have been expected. The states continued to breach their
sacred duties by failing to pay their requisitions and by
vetoing the best tax, the federal impost, which might
replace requisitions. The Founders expressed their anger at
the treachery of the states in immoderate moral and even
religious terms. Failure to pay the war debts was both a
moral issue and a strategic one. In the next, inevitable war
the nation would need to borrow again and to borrow there
would need to be a source of funds to repay at the national
level.
Righteous Anger also argues that the Constitution went
further than was required by the fiscal crisis. The
proximate cause of the Constitution was the need to give
the national government a tax power sufficient to continue
payments on the war debts by enough to restore the public
credit. But Hamilton, as first Secretary of the Treasury, was
able to allow the federal government to borrow again with
taxes of seventy-five cents per capita per year, equal to
about a day and a half of labor wages. Hamilton's taxes
were only on things considered properly suppressed, hard
liquor and imports. Hamilton's taxes were so easy, in
retrospect, that they could easily have been adopted while
preserving the confederation mode. Restoration of the public
credit did not require a revolutionarily more powerful threepart national government and the end of state sovereignty.
If Rhode Island had not vetoed the 1781 impost, the
confederation form of government and the preservation of
state sovereignty could have survived. A federal impost and
sale of western land would have carried the war debts. But
the veto dammed up the pressure, and when the dam burst,
Righteous Anger argued, the constitutional revolution went
further than it needed to go if it was just a matter of
making payments on the war debts.
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B. Taxes instead?
Professor Whittington argues that the emotion of anger
is not necessary or helpful to explain the adoption of the
Constitution. Congress did need the power to tax to restore
the public credit, he concedes. But "[t]o explain the
constitutional change in regard to taxation powers," he says,
"anger seems superfluous. To explain the rest of the
Constitution, anger seems unhelpful."'34 Similarly, Professor
Whittington argues, the Framers needed to break the
unanimity requirement to achieve a national tax, but they
did not need anger to know they needed a national tax.
Righteous Anger argued that "[i]f the Articles of
Confederation had not required unanimity or the Framers
had not been so angry, the Framers might well have tried to
find a solution to the fiscal crisis within the confederate
mode in a way that preserved state sovereignty,"'35 and
Whittington's response is that the impossible unanimity
requirement alone was sufficient to end the articles, without
any anger.'36 The necessity of the national tax power, in
sum, and the need to override the one-state veto allowed by
the Articles of Confederation crowds out anger as a
necessary element.
Even the fact that federal credit could be restored with
modest taxes, Whittington argues, does not undercut the
importance of tax or require anger. "The impost power was
sufficient by itself to repay the existing debts and restore
the creditworthiness of the nation in 1787," he says, but the
Federalists wanted not just to recover from the last war but
also prepare for the next one.'37 The next full war might well
require tax even greater than the Revolution required. In
war, an enemy strong at sea would make imports and the
revenue from taxing imports shrivel. Thus the Federalists
wanted not just the impost, the external or indirect tax, but
they also wanted federal power over internal or "direct
taxes." The hardest fought issue in the ratification debate,
Righteous Anger itself argued, was over federal power to lay
direct or internal taxes. The Anti-Federalists wanted the
federal government to go back to the states for revenue if
134. Recovering, supra note 16, at 1578.
135. RIGHTEOUS ANGER, supra note 11, at 3.
136. Recovering, supra note 16, at 1579.
137. Id. at 1580.
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the impost and sale of western land were ever not sufficient.
The direct tax was the one power that the Anti-Federalists
would not concede to the new national government and
direct tax was the one federal power that the Federalists
would not give up.' The Federalists needed the full threepart powerful national government if that government was
going to collect internal tax, Whittington argues. The
importance of direct tax crowds out anger as a necessary
explanation for the strong national government, even
though the impost and whiskey tax turned out to be so
small.
Emotions-including anger-and cold rationalityincluding calculating the needs for self defense-are
complementary rather than competitive explanations. One
should by and large expect emotions to follow self interest,
or calculation to serve deeper emotional needs. Whichever is
described first, reason and underlying emotion are as
inseparable as quarks. Perhaps Professor Whittington and I
are saying the same nationalistic things about the
formation of the Constitution with different vocabulary, his
from the calculating brain lobe looking for tax revenue, and
mine from the other emotional lobe. Professor Whittington
does, however, sometimes seem to see a difference.
Professor Whittington criticizes the theme of righteous
anger at the states as emphasizing "a moral principle of
honoring contracts rather than the instrumental calculation
of maintaining creditworthiness so as to borrow in future
wars."'39 The Founders said that failure14°
to pay the war debts
and a dangerous
was both a sign of moral depravity
4
dallying with national safety,' with apparent sincerity on
138. See supra note 101.
139. Recovering, supra note 16, at 1579.
140. See, e.g., James Madison, An Address to the States from the Congress
(Apr. 26, 1783), in 24 J. CONTINENTAL CONG., supra note 25, at 283 (saying the
defaults dishonored the "great cause," "the last and fairest experiment in favour
of the right of human nature"); An Address from the United States in Congress
Assembled to the Legislatures of the several States (Oct. 6, 1786), in 31 J.
CONTINENTAL CONG., supra note 25, at 747-48 (with the most plain anxiety, the
Congress is compelled to warn that the most fatal evils will speedily and
inevitably flow from a breach of public faith and a violation of the principles of
justice) and authorities cited in RIGHTEOUS ANGER, supra note 11, at 20-24.
141. See, e.g., Oliver Ellsworth, Connecticut Ratification Convention (Jan.
4, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 15, at 189 (asking if war breaks out,
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both arguments and without any inconsistency. The
Founders were desperate about the destitute government's
inability to borrow for defense, but the desperation
contributed to the anger.
Using national tax as an explanation does not seem to
make the Constitution any less a nationalizing document
than does anger. If national direct tax were strong enough
to crowd out anger, than it must be a dominating factor in
the adoption of the Constitution. If direct tax is at the core
of the Constitution, it harder to justify, e.g. Pollock v.
Farmers' Loan Trust,142 where the Court overruled a
hundred years of doctrine to find an income tax
unconstitutional, under what is a decidedly pro-tax
Constitution.143
Current Anti-Federalists
looking to
decentralize power will not be pleased by an argument that
the Constitution draws its programmatic meaning from its
pro-federal-tax drives. A pro-tax explanation of the
Constitution also does not provide a useful platform for
constitutionalism's treating the document as primarily a
limitation on government. Tax and anger are intertwined
explanations.
Plausibly, however, neither beating unanimity nor
direct tax were necessary to the situation.
1. Unanimity. It is quite plausible that the Founders
needed anger to reject the single state veto allowed by the
Articles of Confederation. Unanimity was an important
value through the Revolution, holding together diverse
states under the motto that won the war, "United, We
Stand." The Founders might well have been able to achieve
unanimity for nationalizing the five percent impost if they
had only not been so mad.
John Kaminski, the long time director of the
Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution
project, has argued that Congress should have accepted
how are we to defend ourselves, since the government "has not the means to
enlist a man or buy an ox") and illustrations, RIGHTEOUS ANGER, supra note 11,
at 18-19 and 151.
142. 157 U.S. 429 (1895), and reh'g, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
143. See, e.g., Calvin Johnson, Fixing the ConstitutionalAbsurdity of the
CONST. COMMENT. 295 (2004) (arguing that
Pollock was wrongly decided).

Apportionment of Direct Tax, 21
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New York's counter-offer as to the 1783 impost and that if it
had, the country would have retained the confederation
format and avoided a too-powerful national government.'"
Rhode Island vetoed the 1781 proposal for a five percent
federal impost and Virginia then quickly retracted its prior
approval. The desperate Congress returned again in 1783,
however, this time limiting the five percent impost to a
twenty-five year duration and dedicating the money only to
the existing war debts.'45 By May 1786, all of the states,
except New York, had ratified the 1783 proposal, including
both Rhode Island and Virginia, the vetoing states of the
1781 proposal. By 1786, however, New York had established
its own state impost on traffic through New York harbor,
and it was unwilling to cede nationalization of the impost
without conditions.
In response to the 1783 impost proposal, New York
made a counter offer. Payments would be made in New
York paper dollars, discounted if necessary to their worth in
specie. Merchants would have procedural rights including
the right to jury on contested issues. Congress considered
the conditions unacceptable and asked New York to
reconsider. In February 1461787 the New York Assembly
refused to alter its stance.
Professor Kaminski argues that Congress should have
accepted New York's counter offer or at least continued
conciliatory negotiations, as, for instance, James Monroe
recommended.' 41 "Had Congress followed this advice,"
Kaminski says, "its financial needs would have been met
and no federal convention would have been called to meet in
Philadelphia in the Spring of 1787. ' '148 With the impost and
sale of western land, the federal government could have
144. John Kaminski, Empowering the Constitution, (July 23, 2005),
(unpublished manuscript presented to the Society for Historians of the Early
American Republic, Philadelphia, on file with the Buffalo Law Review.
145. Address to the States, by the United States in Congress Assembled
(Apr. 26, 1783), in 24 J. CONTINENTAL CONG., supra note 25, at 278.
146. Kaminski, supra note 144 at 5.
147. Kaminski, supra note 144, at 5; Letter from James Monroe to New
York Governor George Clinton (Aug. 16, 1786), in 23 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO
CONGRESS, supra note 26, at 479-80. (saying Congress should proceed with
temper to conciliate and gain the confidence of New York) (emphasis added).
148. Kaminski, supra note 144, at 5.
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made the minimal payments on the war debts until imports
grew important enough to carry the debt comfortably.
Kaminski believes that the confederation form of
government would have been better for America than was
the strong national government the Constitution ordained.
He believes that Congress would have evolved into a
Parliamentary form of government, with John Jay as prime
minister.'49 The Founders would have avoided an imperial
President, modeled on the King.
The Congress, however, rejected New York's conditions.
The Federalists interpreted the New York conditions as
pretextual, tantamount to veto. The New York delegate to
Congress, Melancton Smith, made a case for accepting the
conditions, which did not describe them as vetoing, 5 but
the Federalist interpretation was that New York was
vetoing the national impost, in bad faith, just to keep the
revenue from the New York harbor for its own selfish
purposes. 5 ' "The dominant party in New York" Madison
would say, "had refused even a duty of five percent on
imports for the urgent debt of the Revolution, so as to tax
the consumption of her neighbors." Neighboring Connecticut
reacted angrily at having to pay a New York state impost on
goods passing through New York harbor bound for
Connecticut: "Those gentlemen in New-York who received
large salaries," editorialized the Connecticut Courant,
"know that their offices will be more insecure . . .when the
expences of government shall be paid by their constituents,

149. Kaminski, supra note 144, at 7. In discussion of Kaminski's thesis at
the Society of Historians of the Early American Republic, Philadelphia, July 25,
2005, Professor Pauline Maier of MIT took issue with the argument that the
Congress under the Articles would have evolved into a parliamentary-prime
minister system, in part because not even England had evolved into a
parliamentary-prime minister system at the time.
150. The Resolutions of Congress, Of the 18th of April, 1783:
Recommending the States to invest Congress With the Power to Levy an
Impost, for the Use of the States; and the Laws of the respective States, passed
in pursuance of the said Recommendation. Together with Remarks on the
Resolutions of Congress, and Laws of the different States, By A Republican
(New York, 1787) (cited by Kaminski, supra note 144, at 5).
151. See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Feb. 21,
1787), in 9 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 52, at 285 (saying New York
has put a definitive veto on the impost).
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' When New York vetoed the
than while paid by us."152
1783
impost, it was said153that every "liberal good man is wishing
New York in Hell."'
A polity that is built on consensus and unanimity needs
negotiation to work out differences and needs to
compromise to pull in all the votes. In 1787, Congress was
too angry at New York to perform its function within a
consensus system and to negotiate any further and it did
not care to see anything attractive in New York's counter
offer. One does not need to believe that New York was right
on the merits or that the Articles would have evolved into a
superior form of government to accept that some other
factor, such as anger, was necessary for the rejection of New
York's offer that in fact occurred. The need for the impost
did not require rejecting the unanimity norm, but to get the
impost from New York, the nationalists would have had to
let go of their anger, and, as Monroe put it, negotiate "with
temper . . . to conciliate." ' 4 The Federalists went to the
Convention instead.
As Hamilton put it, "Impost Begat
155
Convention."'

2. Direct tax. The proximate cause of the Constitution
was the desperate need to pay for the debts of the
Revolutionary War. The Constitution might reasonably be
called, first, a tax document, a pro-tax document. The
Federal government needed the impost that New York had
vetoed, almost everyone outside of New York agreed. Within
tax, federal power over direct tax was the issue that most
clearly divided opponents from proponents of the
Constitution. As Whittington notes, the Federalist
proponents of the Constitution wanted Congress to be able
to lay a direct or dry-land tax in times of emergencies and
152. Editorial, New England, CONNECTICUT COURANT (Dec. 24, 1787)
reprintedin 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 37, at 82.
153. Letter from Henry Jackson to Henry Knox (April 23, 1786), quoted in
Robert Feer, Shay's Rebellion and the Constitution:A Study in Causation, 42
NEW ENG. Q. 388, 390 (1969).
154. Letter from James Monroe to New York Governor George Clinton
(Aug. 16, 1786), in 23 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, supra note 26, at
479-80.
155. Alexander Hamilton, Notes for Second Speech of July 17, 1788, to
New York Ratification Convention, in 5 HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 89, at
173.
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the Anti-Federalist opponents uniformly wanted to deny
Congress the power to tax internally except via requisitions
upon the states. Both proponents and opponents of the
Constitution called Federal power to lay direct tax the key
issue of the ratification debates, and sometimes as the only
issue that separated Federalists and Anti-Federalists. 56 A
"direct tax" at the time of debates was a kind of quasirequisition, apportioned among the states. For a requisition,
the states would determine the subjects of tax. A direct tax
would have to be apportioned among states like a
requisition,157 but the federal government would determine
the things taxed. Originally "direct tax" meant all taxes
except for the tax on imports or "imposts," and "direct tax"
and "internal tax" were synonyms. 58
It is difficult nonetheless to take the direct tax issue
very seriously for the following reasons, explained below:
(1) Direct tax did not help ratification because the
majority of the country was skeptical of the need for federal
direct tax, and indeed;
(2) Direct tax was never important over the next
seventy-five years. If there was no welled up anger, the
country could have solved its fiscal problems without a
federal power over direct tax.
(3) Had the direct tax power been what the country
wanted, it could have been accomplished within the
confederation mode. Replacing the confederation with a
strong national government, supreme over the states, was
not required by tax or direct tax alone.
(4) For all the heat, the proponents and opponents of the
federal direct tax ultimately took positions that were not
very different from each other.
a. Direct tax impeded ratification. The Constitution
was ratified in spite of the federal power over direct tax, and
not because of it. The majority of the country was skeptical
156. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 99.
157. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; art. I, § 9, cl. 4. The Constitutional
formula for apportionment of direct tax was a formula worked out in 1783 for
requisitions, but never adopted because of New York's veto of the 1783 proposal.
Johnson, Apportionment, supra note 101, at 19-20.
158. Calvin Johnson, The Four Good Dissenters in Pollock, 32 Sup. CT.
HIST. 162, 165-68 (2007).
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that is was needed. In Virginia, a majority of the ratification
convention was opposed to federal direct tax. The Virginia
Anti-Federalists
recommended
amendment
to
the
Constitution that would have prohibited the federal
government from laying a direct tax, unless a state was in
default in paying its quota of a requisition. The federal
government would have had to rely on requisitions, letting
the states chose what to tax and using state officers. The
Federalists challenged only that direct tax amendment of
all the amendments the Anti-Federalists offered, but lost
the challenge. The Federalists won a close majority in
Virginia for ratification of the Constitution overall, but they
lost on the vote on their challenge to restrictions on federal
direct tax.'59
Beyond Virginia, the Anti-Federalists, once they got
organized, offered their amendment restricting direct tax in
nine states with later conventions and they won a
recommendation for the amendment in seven of the nine
states where the recommendation was made. 6 ° Had federal
direct tax been offered to the ratification conventions in a
way in which it could have been voted on separately, the
federal direct tax would not have been part of the
Constitution.
To the Anti-Federalists, there was no need for
emergency taxes. "The truth is," said Anti-Federalist Brutus
in New York, "no such necessity exists."' ' Some of the
European nations might attack us, Brutus conceded, but if
so, "they will have to transport their armies across the
atlantic, at immense expence, while we should defend
ourselves in our own country."' Where is the danger that
imposes disagreeable taxes on us?, asked another AntiFederalist. "From abroad, we have nothing to fear" because
the European powers' attentions are engaged with each

159. See Virginia Ratification Convention, (June 27, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 15, at 661 (reporting that challenge lost by vote of 65 to 85).
160. RIGHTEOUS ANGER, supra note 11, at 157, has a tally. The direct tax
restriction failed in two early states, Pennsylvania and Maryland, and was not
offered in four early conventions, Delaware, New Jersey, Georgia and
Connecticut, but it won in seven of the last eight conventions. Id.
161. Brutus VII, NEW YORK JOURNAL (Jan. 3, 1788), reprinted in 15
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 37, at 238.
162. Id.
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other.'63 "[At home we are in a state of perfect
tranquility."' The savage Indians would destroy us, Patrick
Henry conceded, but our settlers are stronger than they are
and the threat is as to deprecations on the frontier and not
to the safety of the continent as a whole.'65 The states could
give the federal government reasonable means for the
common defense when and if a necessity did arise.'66 In New
York, the most important subject in the opening essays of
the Federalist is financing of war. But the Federalist
apparently convinced no one at the time, Linda DePauw has
concluded, and in fact drove some fence sitters to the other
side. Publius seemed to be raising the specter of a standing
national army, when few 67
in quiet New York could see the
need for a standing army.
The country was willing to give the federal government
power to pay the current war debts, but the country as a
whole was not in favor of giving it money for a standing
army nor for a speculated war long before the event. The
Constitution was adopted in spite of federal direct tax and
not because of it. Federal direct tax snuck through, even
with a majority in opposition, but it had no mandate from
the people.
b. Direct tax not used. Although the Federalist
proponents asked for and got federal power over direct tax,
the power never amounted to much. The Founders did not
have 20-20 foresight about the future to know that, but the
perspective of time gives support to skepticism that direct
tax was all that important even in 1787. As noted, Hamilton
was able to restore the public credit without relying on
163. Anonymous, Reply to Medium by a Citizen, N.Y. JOURNAL, Nov. 24,
1787, reprinted in THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 47 (Herbert J. Storing ed.,
1981).
164. Id.
165. Patrick Henry, Speech to the Virginia Ratification Convention (June
9, 1788), in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 37, at 1054; see Brutus VII,
NEW YORK JOURNAL (Jan. 3, 1788), reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 37, at 238.
166. Brutus VII, NEW YORK JOURNAL (Jan. 3, 1788), reprinted in 15
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 37, at 238.

167. LINDA GRANT DE PAUW, THE ELEVENTH PILLAR: NEW YORK STATE AND
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 114 (1966) (pointing especially to Federalist No. 9
(Hamilton) as raising the specter of standing army and making enemies).
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direct tax. The first Congress adopted the five percent
impost, blocked by New York in 1783, and later adopted a
whiskey tax to pay off the state as well as the federal war
debts.'
Hamilton rejected direct taxes and land taxes.
Internal tax, first, required the construction of a nationwide administrative structure of appraisers and tax
collectors, whereas imposts could be collected out of a few
customs houses. Hamilton chose the easier way, the
customs houses. Under the Constitution, moreover, direct
taxes need to be apportioned among the states by
population, 69' and when the tax base is not equal per capital
among the states, apportionment is a perverse requirement
that makes the tax rates high in some states and low in
others. 7 ' The direct tax power turned out to be too bulky to
use.
When Thomas Jefferson was elected, direct tax had an
ideological opponent. Thomas Jefferson believed fervently in
decentralizing the financing of war. In 1798, during the
false war with France and as military expenses were
mounting, he proposed an Amendment to the Constitution
whereby the national government would be prohibited from
borrowing, even for war, and would have to rely on the
' Even the
states to "bid their credit in borrowing quotas."171
failed Articles of Confederation had allowed the federal
government to borrow on its own.'72 Under Jeffersonian
ideology, any federal dry-land or internal taxes invaded the
domain of the states. Jefferson first message to Congress
after he was elected in 1800 called for the repeal of all
federal internal taxes, leaving domestic and dry land affairs
168.

RIGHTEOUS ANGER, supra note 11, at

224-28.

169. U.S. Const., art. I, § 2, cl.3; art I. § 9, cl. 4.
170. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 143, at 322-23. Connecticut has roughly
twice the per capita wealth or income of Mississippi. Tax rates for an

apportioned wealth or income tax would have to be twice as high in Mississippi,
because Mississippi has a half as large tax base over which to spread her quota.

Id.
171. Jefferson to John Taylor (Nov. 26, 1798), in 8 WORKS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 481 (Paul Leicester Ford, ed., 1904-05), (emphasis in original).
172. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IX, in 19 J. OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONG., supra note 25, at 220 (requiring approval by nine of the thirteen states
for borrowing on credit of the United States); cf. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION,
art. XII, id. at 221 (pledging the credit of the United States to all debts
contracted under the authority of congress before the Articles of Confederation).
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to the states. 173 Jefferson might have expressed the views of
the majority of America from the start.
Internal revenue did not turn out to be a very important
source of revenue until 1913, far distant in the future in
1787, and only after the Sixteenth Amendment to the
Constitution
was
adopted. Emergencies
call
for
extraordinary remedies, and the country, or at least a
majority of it, would have been willing to wait for the
emergency to give Congress the direct tax and then amend
the Constitution to authorize the tax. In the meantime,
Congress could rely on imposts, excises, and requisitions.
c. Direct tax not inconsistent with confederate mode.
Direct tax was also not inconsistent with state sovereignty,
if the country had wanted direct tax. Congress's 1783
proposal to be allowed federal tax, which New York vetoed,
included both the five percent impost and a requisition upon
the states, with a tilt five-eights of total revenue, to come
from the direct tax.17W The term, "direct tax" arose in this
period to refer to the requisition part of the 1783 proposal,
that is, what was called "direct taxes on each state, justly
proportioned."'75 The 1783 proposal had no effect on the
framework of the confederation mode of government and
state supremacy or sovereignty, guaranteed by the Articles
of Confederation. 76 Hamilton's tax package, adopted under
the Constitution, was more modest than the 1783 impost
proposal that New York vetoed, in many ways. If the 1783
package allowed state sovereignty and a continuation of the
confederation form of government, then so did Hamilton's
173. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson, First Annual Message to Congress, in
BASIC WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 334, 337 (Philip S. Foner, ed., 1944)
(saying that federal government should have power only over foreign affairs,
leaving domestic affairs to the states, and calling for repeal of internal taxes).
174. Address to the States, by the United States in Congress Assembled
(Apr. 26, 1783), in 24 J. CONTINENTAL CONG. 279, supra note 25.
175. Letter from Eliphalet Dyer to Jonathan Trumbull, Sr. (Mar. 18, 1783)
LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, supra note 26, at 41, 45 (emphasis
added).

in 20

176. "Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and
every Power, Jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation expressly
delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled." ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION, art. II, in 19 J. OF THE CONTINENTAL CONG., supra note 25, at
214.
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taxes. Replacing the confederation with a strong national
government supreme over the states was not required by
direct taxes alone.
d. Not much difference between the sides. The
difference between a direct tax, which Anti-Federalists
opposed, and a requisition upon the states, which AntiFederalists favored, is only as to which level chooses the
objects to be taxed. Both direct taxes and requisitions had to
be apportioned among the states and indeed, a direct tax
should be understood as a kind of requisition. The AntiFederalist, in proposing amendments that would have
restricted federal power to lay direct tax conceded the need
for federal revenue, at least in form. 179 In New York, for
example the amendment required the federal government to
use a requisition first and then provided that if a state was
in default of its quota under the requisition, the federal
government could collect direct tax within the state with its
own officers and with a 6 percent penalty level interest.'
Under the Virginia version, the state could suspend federal
collection of a direct tax by passing a legislation for the
collection of its quota by state-chosen means. Whether the
requisition or direct tax was used, the amount and need for
the tax would be set by the federal Congress, and both the
Constitution and the Anti-Federalist substitutes accepted
the premise that the tax would be collected one way or the
other. Once the battle lines were set, the two sides were not
far apart.
The conflict did make a difference as to who would
make a decision as to what to tax. For requisitions, it would
be the state that decided what to tax. For direct tax, it
would be Congress that decided what to tax. In the South,
at least, it is plausible that the direct tax debate is another
disguised skirmish over slavery. George Mason argued in
the Virginia ratification convention that if the Constitution
177. See RIGHTEOUS ANGER, supra note 11, at 156-57.
178. New York Resolution, New York Ratification Convention (July 26,
1788), in 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 15, at 329. The version of the
amendment offered in Virginia required Congress to notify the state governor
when it proposed a direct tax. The state could then suspend collection of the
federal tax if the state passed legislation for collection of the state's quota by
state-chosen means. There was no penalty interest. Resolution in the Virginia
Convention (June 27, 1788) in 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 37, at
1550, 1553-54.
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were adopted, Congress could use its tax powers to lay such
heavy tax on slaves as to amount to manumission.'79
Southern slaveholders in charge of the state legislatures
would never impose too heavy a tax on slaves. Requisitions
were superior, according to Patrick Henry, because the
states would do a better )iob to accommodate tax to the
convenience of the people."
Notwithstanding the federal victory on the issue of
direct tax, however, Congress never in fact taxed the slaves
to manumission. Direct taxes were tried a bit the postconstitutional period, but they never collected much
revenue. 8 ' Given the modesty of direct taxes, it is difficult to
imagine the country would have been very much different
had the Ant-Federalist amendments had passed. The
Constitution did not in fact protect slavery as the AntiFederalists asked, but Congress did not in fact go after it
either. Whittington argues that anger is not needed to
explain the Constitution, because the Federalists wanted
the federal power over direct tax in case of emergencies. In
case
of
emergencies,
under
the
Anti-Federalist
amendments, the Congress would have requisitions. There
is not enough in the differences between the lines as to the
direct tax, to explain very much or to block out other
arguments, including, for instance, anger.
III. Is VALID HISTORY BINDING?
The needs of history and the needs of constitutional law
are profoundly different, perhaps irreconcilable. For
constitutional law and political science, the Constitution is
not just a historical event, but it is a foundational
document, more important than mere legislation and
amendable only by a nearly impossible process. A
strategically placed two percent of the voters can defeat an

179. George Mason, Virginia Ratification Convention (June 15, 1788), in 3
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supranote 15, at 452.
180. Patrick Henry, Debate in the Virginia Ratification Convention (June
12, 1788) in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 15, at 320.
181. See, e.g., EINHORN, supra note 120, at 112, 158, 189-94, 198 (2006)
(discussing direct tax in the post-constitutional period).
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amendment.' : The critical two percent tends to come from
sparely settled states and is surely not a representative
sample." 3 The Constitution, unamended, is binding on us,
against the will of the majority, and the majority can be as
large as ninety-eight percent of the voters and still lose. If
the Constitution is foundational, the Constitution has to be
wise, based on eternal verities, to fill the needs. Law can not
take the Constitution as a curious historical artifact, filled
with partisan errors or misjudgments, because the stakes
are too high.
The Founders had a handicap in the writing of
foundational law in that they could not foresee the next 220
years of developments. We do not have that handicap-the
next 220 years are past history to us-and we too often
forget that they could not see the obvious next steps. So we
impute unto the Founders the ability to write eternal
verities that solve our problems-because like it or not, they
have to.
Solving twenty-first century problems with eternal
verities was in fact not a very important part of what the
Founders were trying to do. The Framers wrote the
Constitution to solve the problems of 1786-1787, which they
knew well, but they knew nothing even about January 1788
or thereafter because it had not happened yet. Given the
direction of time, anything after September 1787 was a
black hole to them. The Constitution is first a historical
weapon written to accomplish programs, the most
important of which was to get the war debts paid. To
understand the meaning of the words in strict historical
context, one must strip away the cover of words and look at
the programs underneath. Words do have radiating ripples
beyond the specific programs, but the further we go from
182. The Constitution requires ratification by three-quarters of the states.
The population of the quarter of the least populated states is thirteen million (in
thirteen states), and a majority of 6.5 million in those states can defeat the
seventy-five percent requirement. The 6.5 million, mostly from sparsely
populated states, represents 2.2 percent of a total 2004 national population of
293 million. See U.S. CENSUS DEP'T., Table 17, Resident Population-States:
1980 to 2004, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (2006), available at
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statat/2006/2006edition.html.
183. Perhaps they lack a gregarious nature or are not attracted to the
excitement of big cities. If there is a problem in densely populated areas that
sparsely populated states are indifferent or hostile to, no amendment can be
expected.
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the hard rock of the programs, the less energy there is in
the ripples. Even to understand the penumbra of the
programs covered by the words, one must first understand
the core programs that the words were intended to
accomplish. The words just allow us to make analogies to
the core the programs. The primary purpose of the
Constitution was accomplished by 1790, when the United
States could borrow on the Dutch market at rates
appropriate to secure loans,1 84 and the new three-part
national government is up and running. The Founders'
intent to accomplish something was satisfied mostly by
1790, and their intent has attenuated strength after that
date.
Indeed try a thought experiment. Take the most
important current hard-fought partisan issue. Write an
editorial, or an op-ed piece, showing how your opponents
badly misunderstand the issue and that if the issue were
only seen right, there is a solution. Appeal to any reason,
authority or eternal verity that you want to persuade the
pivotal voter. Now expand the piece, while solving the
current issue, to solve the foundational problems of the year
2228 as well. Not so easy is it? The future is hard to predict,
as Yogi said, because it has not happened yet.
The Founders did appeal to eternal verities.
Slaveholders were willing to take and offer proofs that
slavery was consistent with all of human history and the
wisdom of all countries. 85 The Founders and AntiFederalists cited Montesquieu and Locke so long as they
served their agenda. But the Founders did not have any
loyalty to philosophic verities and they discarded the
verities as soon as they were inconvenient. The most
interesting systematic argument in the debates is Madison's
Federalist No. 10 proof of the superiority of the federal
government, and he discarded the proof by 1791, four years
after these eternal truths were written, because he wanted,
not to defend the federal government, but to attack its

184. James C. Riley, Foreign Credit and Fiscal Stability: Dutch Investment
in the United States, 1781-1794, 65 J. AMER. HIST. 654, 668-69 (1978).
185. See, e.g., Charles Pinckney (South Carolina) (Aug. 22, 1787), in 2
FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 12, at 371 (slavery sanctioned by Greece, Rome
and modern states).
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programs." 6 The foundational document for the Framers
was the Articles of Confederation, and while the Articles
pledged an eternal confederation, they were badly in need of
amendment when ratified and they lasted only from 1781 to
1788 before they were replaced in full." 7 Be skeptical when
the Founders in fact appealed to eternal truths because
their most profound eternal truths sometimes were of four
to seven years duration.
History as a professional discipline has a profound
distrust for "presentism," defined as using historical facts to
solve current problems. The past is a very different place.
Using twenty-first century frameworks imposed as a
template on 1787 arguments makes it difficult, perhaps
impossible to understand the very different context of 1787.
Lawyers and political scientists are strictly presentists.
They care almost not at all about careful reconstruction of a
strange different age unless it generates useful lessons for
today. The framework of looking for lessons for today,
however, ruins the possibility of understanding the past in
its own terms. Indeed, one can gain only limited
understanding from reading a historical text, over and over
again, far removed from the context in which it was
written. 8 With each reading the historical text gets warped
to a twenty-first century meaning. With each reading the
text picks up a new current meaning so that by the fifth
read, the text is solving marital problems. To understand
the historical meaning, we have to look, not for the
186. See NATIONAL GAZETTE (Dec. 1791, Jan. 1791, Sept. 1792), reprinted
in 6 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 68, 81, 114 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901) (saying
the states were the repositories of republican virtue because they are
homogeneous, which is exactly the opposite of Federalist No. 10's position that
diversity yielded better protection of individual rights). See Douglas Jaenick,
Madison v. Madison: the Party Essays v. the FederalistPapers, in REFLECTIONS
ON THE CONSTITUTION: THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AFTER TWO HUNDRED YEARS

116 (Richard Maidment & John Zvesper, eds. 1989) (contrasting the nationalism
of Madison in the Constitutional period with the state focus after breaking with
Hamilton).
187. The Congress offered amendments to the Articles to allow a federal
five percent impost and to allow seizures of merchandise to enforce state
requisitions within a month of ratification of the Articles. RIGHTEOUS ANGER,
supra note 11, at 84.
188. See Quentin Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the History of
Ideas, in MEANING AND CONTEXT: QUENTIN SKINNER AND HIS CRITICS 29 (James

Tully, ed., 1988).
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connotations or abstractions of words in the twenty-first
century, but for the programs that gave the words their
concrete meaning in 1787-1788.
Professor Whittington dislikes a history of the
Constitution loyal to its times. "The oddity of Righteous
Anger from an originalist perspective," he writes, "is that it
tends to render the Constitution irrelevant to modern
politics. The Constitution is not a timeless document; it had
exhausted its purpose by 1791. " 189 "The transformation of
texts taken to be timeless documents into something of only
antiquarian interest," he also says, "is a recurrent risk of
those adopting the Skinnerian approach to history."' 90 "The
oddity created by the reduction of the meaning of the
Founders' Constitution to taxes and anger," he says, "is that
it effectively seals the Constitution off from subsequent
political developments, and the founding begins to seem
trivial. Righteous Anger has less to say about the ways in
which the Constitution continued to matter in politics than
it should."'91
Alas, for better or worse, Whittington's indictment is
probably true of all accurate history, certainly all
professional history. Gordon Wood comments about the role
of history is an apt reply:
They [e.g. lawyers and political scientists] do not want to hear
about the unusability and pastness of the past or about the latent
limitations within which people in the past were obliged to act.
They do not want to hear about the blindness of people in the past
or about the inescapable boundaries of their actions. Such a history
has no immediate utility and is apt to remind us of our own
of our own inability to control events and predict
powerlessness,
192
the future.

If you want to understand the historical Constitution in
genuine terms, it cannot be shoehorned into a
own
its
twenty-first century framework. The historical Constitution
189. Recovering, supra note 16, at 1584.
190. Id. at 1584 n.107.
191. Id. at 1585.
192. Gordon S. Wood, The Creative Imagination of Bernard Bailyn, in
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was a product of a time and place very different from our
own. As one literary critic put it, "interpreting the text is
not simply a matter of providing 'context' and 'background.'
"Instead, it is more exactly in . . . coming to know again
those beliefs, dreads, 193unscrutinized expectations which may
differ from our own."
The Constitution was a weapon in a partisan war, a war
I think the Federalists needed to win, but still a partisan
war. As a historical event, the Constitution was not written
to provide lessons for today because that was not and could
not have been a very important part of what the Federalists
were trying to do. We can learn from traditions, stories and
history. Still, I think we decide what use we want to make
of the ancient Greeks and other history; the ancient Greeks
do not decide for us.
It is, however, rather not cricket in a Democracy to
make up the history to win a current partisan fight, on the
constitutional level, trumping a majority, that can be as
large as ninety-eight percent majority at the limits, with
false claims of binding constitutional law. The Supreme
Court in finding states' rights in this Constitution is finding
fake artifacts, planted by the Court in the history shortly
before they are unearthed. It is a bit like burying Barbie
Dolls at an archeological site and then pretending that you
have discovered something profound when they are
unearthed a few days later. Made up history should not be
binding us, reversible only by amendments supported by
ninety-eight percent of the population. Righteous Anger did
not make a very good case for originalism, that is, that the
decisions of 1787 should lead us now. But perhaps it can
perform a negative function, preventing fake history from
binding us now-ignoring Barbie Dolls in the archeological
dig and the like.

193. Gillian Beer, Representing Women: Re-presenting the Past, in
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thankful to Sarah Bilston of Trinity College, Hartford, for the lovely quote,
which changed my thinking.

